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We investigate the relationship between boardroom gender diversity and firm risk. To
identify a causal effect of gender on risk, we use a dynamic model that controls for
reverse causality and for gender and risk being influenced by unobservable firm factors.
We find no evidence that female boardroom representation influences equity risk. We
also show that findings of a negative relationship between the two variables are spurious
and driven by unobserved between-firm heterogeneous factors.
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1. Introduction
A substantial and growing literature links the composition of the board of directors
to observable firm outcomes. We contribute to this literature by examining whether the
gender composition of a board affects firm risk. This is an important research question.
Recently, various firms have come under public pressure to increase the gender diversity on
their boards1, and a number of European countries (among them Belgium, France, Norway
and Italy) have passed legislation mandating more female board representation for certain
firms. However, the economic consequences of more female directors are not well understood.
While studies in economics and psychology find that women have less risk appetite than men
(Hinz, McCarthy, and Turner, 1997; Byrnes, Miller, and Schafer, 1999; Barber and Odean,
2001), it is unclear whether greater female board representation means that firms engage in
less risk-taking. If firms that appoint more female board members were to make less risky
policy choices and investment decisions, these firms could ultimately become less competitive
players in their industries. Additionally, boards of directors now face heightened expectations
regarding their role in risk oversight2. The gender diversity of a board could therefore also
be important for effective risk oversight.
This paper examines whether gender diversity affects firm risk using a sample of US
firms from 1996-2010. To date, the literature has examined how the gender of the CEO and
other senior executives affects risk (Berger, Kick, and Schaeck, 2014; Huang and Kisgen,
2013; Faccio, Marchica, and Mura, 2014) and how board diversity in banks affects bank risk
(Adams and Ragunathan, 2013). However, the extant literature has not examined the risk
implications of gender diversity on the boards of non-financial firms, which is the focus of
this study. Sapienza, Zingales, and Maestripieri (2009) find women who enter the financial
1For instance, Twitter came under fire in the media over its exclusively male board of directors. Although
the company’s CEO replied that the director appointment process should be more than just “checking a box”,
the company still responded by appointing Marjorie Scardino as its first female director in December 2013.
See ‘Twitter has taken a good step forward, but needs more than one female director’, Forbes, September
12, 2013.
2See Securities and Exchange Commission’s Regulation S-K 407(h).
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industry to be less risk averse than women entering other industries. This suggests that the
findings from the banking sector on the gender-risk link may not apply to other sectors and
calls for a more general enquiry into the risk implications of greater gender diversity on the
boards of non-financial firms.
Establishing a causal relationship between gender diversity and risk is challenging. Board
characteristics are not exogenous random variables. They are endogenously chosen by firms
to suit their operating and contracting environment (Adams and Ferreira, 2007; Coles,
Daniel, and Naveen, 2008; Harris and Raviv, 2008). Two sources of endogeneity are partic-
ularly likely to bias our estimates of how gender affects firm risk.
First, omitted unobservable firm characteristics (both fixed and time-varying) may si-
multaneously affect both the director appointment process and firm risk. Empirical models
cannot possibly capture all the determinants of firm risk. There will be other factors, observ-
able and unobservable, that influence both the director appointment process and risk. An
example of an unobservable driver of firm risk is a firm’s attitude towards corporate social
responsibility (CSR)3. Both theory and empirical evidence from a board literature on CSR
suggest that a firm’s engagement with its stakeholders reduces both systematic and idiosyn-
cratic risk (Freeman, 1984; Waddock and Graves, 1997; Godfrey, 2005). At the same time, a
firm’s compliance with a CSR agenda may influence both the demand and supply of women
to the board of directors. On the demand side, gender diversity is one of the social respon-
sibility dimensions on which the firm is evaluated by its stakeholders4 CSR-compliant firms
will thus have a higher demand for women directors. On the supply side, CSR-compliant
firms may attract women directors as evidence shows that women directors care more than
3Whilst quantitative and thus measurable indicators of social performance exist (e.g. ESG Research Data
from Thomson Reuters or KLD rating data from Kinder, Lydenberg, Domini and Co.), these measures are
based on public data and in some cases voluntary disclosure by firms. Therefore, social performance data
tend to only be available for a subset of firms. Furthermore, social responsibility itself could be determined
by other institutional factors such as the presence of monitoring by certain institutions, institutionalized
norms and engagement with stakeholders (Campbell, 2007). These factors cannot be readily observed and
thus are generally omitted from empirical models.
4For example, Coca-Cola communicates its boardroom gender diversity policy through its corporate social
responsibility report.
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men about self-transcendence values (universalism and benevolence) and may thus identify
better with, and offer their services to, socially responsible firms (Chatman, 1989; Turban
and Greening, 1997; Adams and Funk, 2012). In these circumstances, omitted unobservable
variables such as corporate attitudes towards CSR could cause us to report a negative but
non-causal relationship between female boardroom representation and firm risk.
Second, the direction of causality between firm risk and appointment decisions is unclear
ex-ante. Rather than appointments affecting firm risk, firm risk may affect appointment
decisions. For instance, female directors may self-select into lower risk firms, possibly as a
result of their widely-documented higher risk aversion (Farrell and Hersch, 2005). Therefore,
reverse causality could explain a negative relationship between female board representation
and firm risk. Additionally, Wintoki, Linck, and Netter (2012) and Cicero, Wintoki, and
Yang (2013) demonstrate that reverse causality issues around board characteristics are dy-
namic. For our study, this means that current female boardroom representation is likely to
be influenced by past realizations of firm risk.
A common empirical strategy to deal with endogeneity is to identify an instrumental vari-
able that explains gender representation on the board but is exogenous to the firm outcomes
being investigated. However, it is challenging to find a truly exogenous instrumental variable
for gender diversity. For instance, we present some evidence in this paper that a variable
commonly employed as a source of exogenous variation in gender diversity (the number of
female connections of male directors) is not truly exogenous in our data set.
Taking into account (i) these endogeneity issues, (ii) the dynamic nature of these endo-
geneity issues and (iii) the challenges around identifying a suitable instrument, we employ a
dynamic panel system GMM estimator to estimate a dynamic model of equity risk. We find
no evidence that female boardroom representation affects any of the measures of equity risk
we analyze (total, systematic and idiosyncratic risk). Our findings hold in various GMM
specifications. The results are also robust to us using difference-in-difference estimators, an
operating performance measure of risk (the standard deviation of a firm’s return on assets)
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and a range of firm policy measures of risk. The results of the various tests and robustness
tests presented all point to the same conclusion. A board with a higher proportion of female
directors is no more or less risk-taking than a more male-dominated board.
We also shed some light on the different sources of endogeneity and how they affect
the reported gender-risk relationship. Our results offer some support for reverse causality
concerns. We find that firm risk is negatively related to the probability that a female
director is appointed. However, this effect is small in magnitude and therefore unlikely
to drive any spurious relationship between gender and risk. Instead, the main sources of
endogeneity that would cause us to report a negative but spurious relationship between
gender diversity and risk are unobservable firm-level factors. We show that unobserved
between-firm heterogeneous factors are important drivers of board gender diversity and risk,
and that not controlling for these factors leads to a spurious negative effect of gender diversity
on risk.
Our paper makes the following contributions to the literature. First, we extend the
literature that investigates the link between gender diversity and risk in banks (Adams
and Ragunathan, 2013; Berger et al., 2014) by providing the first study that examines the
gender-risk link for a cross-industry sample. We also contribute to a broader literature
that has documented the relations between firm risk-taking and other corporate governance
characteristics, including CEO gender, financial expertise, ownership, compensation and the
presence of institutional investors (e.g. Faccio et al., 2014; Wahal and McConnell, 2000;
Minton, Taillard, and Williamson, 2014; Coles, Daniel, and Naveen, 2006; Kim and Lu,
2011). Ahern and Dittmar (2012) and Matsa and Miller (2013) investigate the relationship
between the presence of female directors and debt policy.
Second, our paper contributes more generally to the literature on the hitherto inconclusive
debate over director gender and firm value. While female board representation is linked to
a range of arguably desirable firm outcomes such as board attendance, lower M&A bid
premiums and less risky business decisions (e.g. Levi, Li, and Zhang, 2013; Adams and
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Ragunathan, 2013), evidence linking gender diversity to firm performance is less conclusive
(e.g. Adams and Ferreira, 2009; Liu, Wei, and Xie, 2014). Many studies that examine the
gender-performance link use operating performance measures, which are not risk-adjusted
(e.g. ROA, ROE or other accounting variables)5. These studies can only reveal part of
the story, because two firms with identical cash flows can exhibit different levels of risk.
Therefore, even when gender does not affect operating performance it may still have an
effect on firm risk6. We contribute to this literature by confirming that risk is not a channel
through which gender affects firm value.
Finally, we illustrate the impact of endogeneity on the estimated relationship between
gender diversity and firm risk by showing that the negative gender-risk relationship is largely
driven by between-firm variations. Our findings add to previous studies that document
different relationships between board and performance variables depending on the choice of
estimator (Adams and Ferreira, 2009; Wintoki et al., 2012).
2. Literature Review
Return and risk can be seen as two sides of the same coin. Firms engage in risky projects
with positive net present value in order to generate returns for shareholders. As firm value
can be viewed as the sum of future cash flows discounted by an appropriate rate of return that
accounts for risk, it is appropriate that both risk and return are considered by managers.
Agency theory suggests that managers are risk averse due to concerns about their own
undiversified human capital (Fama, 1980; Holmstro¨m, 1999) and the literature investigates
5Some of these studies also examine Tobin’s Q, which is measured as the market-to-book ratio and is a
proxy for a firm’s growth opportunities. Although Tobin’s Q is a risk-adjusted measure (it is based on a
firm’s market value), Wintoki et al. (2012) argue that this measure is more likely to be a cause rather than
a consequence of a firm’s governance structure. This argument is supported by theoretical works such as
Raheja (2005) and Harris and Raviv (2008). Various empirical works including Boone, Field, Karpoff, and
Raheja (2007) and Linck, Netter, and Yang (2008) also find evidence that supports this argument.
6Other studies use risk-adjusted measures of performance changes, but reach conflicting conclusions.
Ahern and Dittmar (2012) document a decline in equity prices following the introduction of a gender quota
in Norway, while Adams, Gray, and Nowland (2011) find that appointments of female directors result in
higher stock market performance than male director appointments.
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how managers can be induced to make risky choices through various corporate governance
mechanisms. These mechanisms include both external mechanisms such as monitoring by
shareholders and internal mechanisms such as risk-rewarding remuneration (Leland, 1998;
Coles et al., 2006). One governance mechanism believed to have a particularly large impact
on risk is the board of directors.
2.1. Board characteristics and firm risk-taking behavior
Existing literature suggests that boards matter for firm risk-taking. Studies have at-
tempted to identify the influence of board characteristics on firm risk. Cheng (2008) finds
that firms with smaller boards have higher performance variability and accounting accruals,
and participate more frequently in mergers and acquisitions. Pathan (2009) finds a negative
relationship between board size and stock return volatility. However, the directors in these
studies are treated as a homogenous group without controlling for personal characteristics
such as gender, ethnicity, qualifications, personalities and beliefs. Variations in these char-
acteristics, and gender in particular, may be able to explain the difference in risk-taking
choices amongst firms.
2.2. Do female directors affect firm risk?
Studies in both the psychology and economics literature find that women tend to be
more averse to risk than men. A meta-analysis of 150 studies on risk-taking behavior reports
that men are more likely to be involved in ‘risky experiments’, ‘intellectual risk taking’ and
‘gambling’ than women (Byrnes et al., 1999). In experimental settings, men exhibit a greater
tendency to make risky choices than women. For example, women are found to be more risk
averse in experiments using lotteries with known probabilities and monetary outcomes (e.g.
Levin, Snyder, and Chapman, 1988; Fehr-Duda, de Gennaro, and Schubert, 2006). Further,
women are more conservative in making investment decisions (e.g. Sunden and Surette, 1998;
Bernasek and Shwiff, 2001). Croson and Gneezy (2009) provide an overview of the literature
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in this area.
However, these studies investigate the risk attitudes of women in the general population.
In their sample of economic, finance and business students, Deaves, Lu¨ders, and Luo (2009)
do not find women to be less overconfident than men. They postulate that women who are
attracted to ‘male’ disciplines may be different from those in the population. In the context
of our study, it is plausible that female directors possess characteristics that have helped
them to climb the corporate ladder and become directors. Adams and Funk (2012), for
instance, hypothesize that the degree of risk aversion in women may vanish once they have
broken through the glass ceiling and have adapted to a male-dominated culture. In a Swedish
sample, they find that female directors are more risk-loving than their male counterparts.
Nonetheless, provided that there are differences in risk attitude between the genders, it is
possible that the gender composition of the board may explain the variation in corporate
risk-taking behavior.
At the board level, the interaction between directors of different genders may also im-
pact decisions (Hoogendoorn, Oosterbeek, and van Praag, 2013) . On the one hand, board
diversity may result in more board scrutiny and better decision making. On the other hand,
diversity could cause conflict and, as a result, consensus may be more difficult to achieve.
The risk implications of this are difficult to gauge ex-ante. More scrutiny can potentially
lead to lower firm risk given the same level of return, whilst risk may increase if it is more
time consuming for directors to reach decisions.
2.3. Empirical studies on board gender diversity
There are a limited number of studies on the impact of female board representation
on firm risk-taking behavior. Wilson and Altanlar (2011) find insolvency risk to be nega-
tively related to the proportion of female directors. Levi et al. (2013) find that firms with
male-dominated boards are more likely to participate in M&A activities and pay higher ac-
quisition premiums. They attribute these results to the tendency of female directors to be
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less overconfident than their male counterparts. Beck, Behr, and Guettler (2013) find that
loans made by female officers are less likely to result in payment in arrears as they are better
at monitoring by building interpersonal relationships. However, greater female boardroom
representation is not always associated with less risky behaviors. Matsa and Miller (2013)
find a negative but insignificant change in leverage after the Norwegian female boardroom
representation quota. The authors posit that “risk aversion may not be a distinctive part of
women’s approach to corporate decision-making”. Berger et al. (2014) find that an increase
in the proportion of female bank directors results in increased portfolio risk.
Most of the research in the area of gender diversity on boards of directors focuses on
profitability outcomes and, so far, there is no consensus in the literature on the relationship
between female representation and a firm’s prospects. Some studies find that board diversity
leads to better performance whereas others find no such relationship (e.g. Carter, Simkins,
and Simpson, 2003; Gregory-Smith, Main, and O’Reilly, 2014).
Another strand of the literature looks at the determinants of boards appointing female
directors and firm risk is found to be one of the determinants of female board appointments.
Adams and Ferreira (2004) find that firms with more volatile stock returns tend to have
fewer female directors on their board. The authors explain these results using the argu-
ment of Kanter (1977) that group homogeneity (i.e. a male-dominated board) is essential
in environments where uncertainty is high. Similarly, Farrell and Hersch (2005) find that
the propensity of female director appointments is higher in less risky and better performing
firms. They argue that female directors can self-select into these firms due to demand for
gender diversity.
Farrell and Hersch (2005) also find that female directors are more likely to be appointed
to boards with fewer female directors or when the appointment follows female director depar-
tures. Gregory-Smith et al. (2014) find similar results for UK firms. However, the authors
do not establish a relation between firm risk and the gender of directors being appointed for
their sample of UK firms. Overall, these results suggest that a director’s gender or the pro-
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portion of female directors on boards are not exogenous random variables, and that reverse
causality is likely to be an issue when investigating the impact of gender diversity.
3. Methodology
This section starts by discussing why the relationship between female boardroom rep-
resentation and firm risk could be endogenous. It then discusses an empirical specification
that takes into account the two sources of endogeneity that are of concern in board studies
– unobserved heterogeneity and reverse causality. Lastly, we introduce a dynamic model
between female boardroom representation and risk and propose the dynamic panel system
generalized method of moments estimator (DPS-GMM, hereafter) as a suitable estimator
that allows us to test whether female boardroom representation impacts on firm risk.
3.1. Endogeneity issues in estimating the relationship between female board-
room representation and risk measures
There is a general consensus in the literature that board characteristics are not exogenous
random variables. Instead, they are endogeneously chosen by the firm to suit its operating
and information environments as well as the bargaining power of various stakeholders in
the firm. Amongst others, Fama and Jensen (1983) and Coles et al. (2008) argue that
board characteristics are affected by the scope and complexity of the firm. Equally, the
level of information asymmetry prevailing between insiders and outsiders could affect board
characteristics if board characteristics are chosen such that insiders are incentivized to reveal
sufficient private information for the board to fulfil its monitoring and advising functions
(Adams and Ferreira, 2007; Harris and Raviv, 2008; Linck et al., 2008)7 .
7This view is formally explained as theoretical models by Raheja (2005), Adams and Ferreira (2007), and
Harris and Raviv (2008). Linck et al. (2008) finds that board size and independence are negatively associated
with growth opportunities, R&D expenditure and R&D volatility, suggesting that these types of firms may
not require intensive monitoring.
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The possibility that female boardroom representation is a choice variable has to be taken
into account when estimating the gender-risk relationship. To reliably test whether female
boardroom representation affects firm risk, at least two alternative explanations must be
considered: that the gender-risk relationship is driven by omitted unobserved factors or by
reverse causality. We discuss both alternative explanations below.
3.1.1. Omitted unobserved factors
The first alternative explanation is that omitted unobservable firm characteristics (both
fixed and variable across time) may affect both the director selection and firm risk. For
example, a firm’s desire to act as a responsible citizen (or to appear so) could be linked to
both risk and gender diversity. There is evidence consistent with this from a broad literature
on corporate social responsibility.
Most prominently, stakeholder theory (Freeman, 1984) implies a number of risk-relevant
implications from the relationship between a firm and its various stakeholders including
customers, employees, community groups, governments and investors8. For instance, main-
taining good relationships with stakeholders increases firm legitimacy while decreasing the
“firm-specific” risk of legal prosecutions, regulatory sanctions, customer boycotts, and labor-
related problems (Waddock and Graves, 1997). Additionally, socially responsible firms may
be perceived as better managed and, as a result, less risky (McGuire et al., 1988). Simi-
larly, investors may be less likely to react negatively to adverse firm-specific events (Godfrey,
2005).
These explanations suggest that socially responsible firms are associated with lower firm-
specific risk. Next to lower firm-specific risk, being socially responsible can also reduce
systematic risk. Albuquerque, Durnev, and Koskinen (2014) present a theoretical model
8 An alternative view is that only firms with abundant resources participate in socially responsible activ-
ities (see McGuire, Sundgren, and Schneeweis, 1988; McGuire, 1990) and that corporate social responsibility
is a result of agency conflicts within the firm (Masulis and Reza, 2015). Both stakeholder and slack resource
theories predict a positive relation between corporate social responsibility and profitability. However, the
social responsibility and risk relation is unclear under the slack resource view.
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where social responsibility decreases the sensitivity of firm profitability to economic condi-
tions through increased customer loyalty.
These theories are supported by empirical evidence that shows a negative relation between
corporate social responsibility and both systematic and idiosyncratic risk measures (Spicer,
1978; Orlitzky and Benjamin, 2001; Oikonomou, Brooks, and Pavelin, 2012; Lee and Faff,
2009).
At the same time, corporate social responsibility can be positively related to gender
diversity through at least two mechanisms. First, socially responsible firms may be more
likely to appoint women to the boardroom. Appointing female directors is arguably a way
through which firms seek legitimacy (Carleton, Nelson, and Weisbach, 1998; Agrawal and
Knoeber, 2001). Incidentally, boardroom gender diversity is one of the various elements
firms are formally evaluated on in terms of social responsibility9 as well as part of some
firms’ social responsibility plans. For example, Coca-Cola Enterprises explicitly state in their
2013-2014 Corporate Responsibility and Sustainability Report10 that the company aims for
greater representation of women in top positions. Empirical studies generally show a positive
association between gender diversity and corporate social performance (see e.g. Johnson and
Greening, 1999; Boulouta, 2012).
Second, social responsibility may be more attractive to women directors (Turban and
Greening, 1997). Social identity theory suggests that people define who they are based on
their group memberships (Chatman, 1989; Dutton, Dukerich, and Harquail, 1994). Adams
and Funk (2012) find in their sample of directors that women care more about self-transcen-
dence values (such as universalism and benevolence11). Therefore, social responsibility may
9 Boardroom gender diversity is included in the environmental, social and governance factors that are
used by asset managers who screen for socially responsible firms. It is also a part of the criteria of many social
investment indices such as Dow Jones Sustainability Indices, in which the scoring methodology explicitly
includes gender diversity as a relevant dimension. See http://www.sustainability-indices.com/images/
CSA_2014_Annual_Scoring_Methodology_Review.pdf.
10See https://www.cokecce.com/corporate-responsibility-sustainability/.
11 Schwartz, Melech, Lehmann, Burgess, Harris, and Owens (2001) define benevolence as “preservation
and enhancement of the welfare of people with whom one is in frequent personal contact and ”universalism
as “understanding, appreciation, tolerance and protection for the welfare of all people and for nature”.
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be positively related to boardroom gender diversity through both a firm’s higher tendency
to appoint women directors (the demand side) and an increased number of women in the
pool of candidates for board positions (the supply side).
Whilst the literature uses various measures of social performance to proxy for corporate
social responsibility12, these measures come from disclosed outcomes rather than a firm’s
actual attitude and tendency toward social responsibility (Ullmann, 1985). Therefore, the
data is only available for a subset of firms. Furthermore, social responsibility itself could be
determined by other institutional factors such as the presence of monitoring organizations,
institutionalized norms and the level of engagement by their stakeholders (Campbell, 2007).
These factors cannot be readily observed and thus are generally omitted from empirical
models.
Another example of omitted unobserved factors in the risk equation is managerial ability.
CEOs of high ability may be more effective in terms of managing firm risk (such that firms
have lower risk for a given level of profits), whilst also having more influence over director
appointment decisions (Hermalin and Weisbach, 1988)13. While powerful managers may well
be indifferent with regards to the gender of appointees, it is conceivable that these managers
prefer directors who are less likely to be effective monitors. Existing empirical evidence
suggests that female directors are more independent, that is, more likely to be effective
monitors of CEOs14. If this is the case, it is possible that unobserved managerial ability and
preferences for a less independent board would be correlated with gender diversity.
12Examples are environmental, social and corporate governance (ESG) data from Thomson Reuters and
Kinder, Lydenberg, Domini and Co. (KLD).
13Prior evidence shows that CEOs have influence over the selection of board candidates (e.g. Shivdasani
and Yermack, 1999). Although NYSE and NASDAQ listing rules have reduced the influence of CEOs in the
nomination process, they at the very least are still able to approve the list of director candidates and these
candidates are often voted in by shareholders (Cai, Garner, and Walking, 2009; Coles, Daniel, and Naveen,
2014).
14Adams and Ferreira (2009) observe that women directors allocate more effort to monitoring compared
to male directors. Futhermore, Adams and Funk (2012) find that female directors are more independently
minded. Women directors in their sample care less about tradition, conformity and security and are more
open to change. Ferreira (2014) argues that the female boardroom representation may better represent
the level of board independence than the nominal measure of independence (i.e. the proportion of outside
directors).
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Under these explanations, we would observe a relation between female boardroom rep-
resentation and firm risk measures even in the absence of a causal relationship between the
two variables. While the literature generally deals with unobservables by using a fixed ef-
fects estimator, this is insufficient due to a second alternative explanation which needs to be
considered, reverse causality.
3.1.2. Reverse causality
The second alternative explanation is that it is risk that influences appointment deci-
sions. Hermalin and Weisbach (1998) suggest that the monitoring intensity increases when
the board finds it more difficult to judge CEO ability. If this is the case in risky firms (where
volatile market indicators make for noisy signals of CEO ability), boards may decide to
increase monitoring by hiring more female directors (who have a reputation for better moni-
toring; see Adams and Ferreira, 2009). Alternatively, female directors may simply self-select
into lower risk firms due to their higher risk aversion (Farrell and Hersch, 2005). In either
case, one would observe a positive relationship between the fraction of female directors on
board and firm risk.
Finally, we rely on the insight of Wintoki et al. (2012) that reverse causality issues in
governance research tend to be of a dynamic nature. For the purposes of our study, this
means that current female boardroom representation is influenced by past realizations of firm
risk. Intuitively, this is because at the time the appointment decision is made, the current
risk level of the firm has not been realized and therefore cannot be observed. Therefore, only
past risk measures would be in the information set considered by the existing board when
making appointment decisions. This insight allows us to introduce a dynamic model in the
next section that allows for the possibility of unobserved heterogeneity and the influence of
past risk on female boardroom representation.
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3.2. Identification strategy
To reliably measure the influence of female boardroom representation on firm risk, we
require an empirical model that takes into account the influence of unobserved heterogeneity
and past realizations of risk on the choice of director gender and current risk. In this
section, we introduce a dynamic model that allows for these possibilities. We then argue
that the commonly used ordinary least squares (OLS) and fixed effects estimators cannot
produce reliable inferences for models of this type. We finally propose the DPS-GMM as an
appropriate estimator.
We have established in the previous section that the proportion of female directors on
board is a choice variable and that it can be influenced by other board characteristics, firm
characteristics, other unobserved factors and past realizations of risk. This can be formally
written as:
Proportion of Womeni,t = f(Xi,t,Riski,t−1,Riski,t−2, . . . ,Riski,t−p, ηi) (1)
The matrix Xi,t represents other determinants of director gender such as other board
and firm characteristics. The variables Riski,t−1,Riski,t−2, . . . ,Riski,t−p represent past risk
measures at lag 1, 2, . . . , p respectively and ηi is time invariant unobserved heterogeneity
(e.g. corporate behavior and CEO ability). These variables are not only determinants of
the current level of female boardroom representation, they are also likely to be correlated
with the current level of risk. Thus, to accurately estimate a relationship between female
boardroom representation and the risk measure, these variables need to be included, resulting
in a model as follows.
Riski,t = α + βProportion of Womeni,t + Xi,tΓ +
p∑
s=1
δsRiski,t−s + {ηi + εi,t} (2)
This dynamic model with fixed effects means that current firm risk is affected by both
unobserved heterogeneity (through ηi) and by past realizations of risk (through Riski,t−1,
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Riski,t−2, . . . ,Riski,t−p).
The relationship between firm risk and female boardroom representation is captured by β.
To consistently estimate β using the OLS estimator, the proportion of women on the board
must not be correlated with the residual term (which in this case is ηi + εi,t in Equation 2).
This is not a realistic assumption. Considering that female boardroom representation, like
other board characteristics, is a choice made by a firm and can be influenced by unobserved
heterogeneity such as CEO ability and corporate culture (captured by ηi), the residual term
would be correlated with the proportion of women and the OLS estimates of β would be
inconsistent.
Neither can the fixed effects estimator, which removes the unobserved heterogeneity from
the model by demeaning all the variables, yields a consistent estimate. The implicit assump-
tion of the fixed effects estimator that is often not acknowledged is that it requires all inde-
pendent variables, both the proportion of women and control variables, to be uncorrelated
with contemporaneous, past and future residual terms (the strict exogeneity assumption).
Under the presence of a dynamic relationship between risk and female boardroom repre-
sentation this assumption is violated by construction. This is because firm risk is highly
correlated across time. The only situation where this estimator is consistent is when the
effect of past risk on current risk weakens over time and the time dimension of the panel
sample is large. While the former is a reasonable assumption, it is difficult to obtain a panel
sample with a sufficiently long time dimension.
Considering this limitation, we rely on the assumption that firms choose a certain pro-
portion of female directors to target a certain risk profile. In order to choose a level of female
representation, those charged with making appointments (the CEO and existing directors)
rely on information available to them at the time of the appointment. The information set
used to make appointment decisions includes past values of realized risk as well as existing
board and firm characteristics15. In essence, appointment decisions are made based on an ex-
15This is consistent with the weak-form rational expectation theory of Muth (1961) and Lovell (1986).
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pected level of future firm risk. Therefore, once the actual risk of the firm has been realized,
the unexpected component of the error term can be assumed to be uncorrelated with the
current information set. This is consistent with the generalized method of moments orthog-
onality conditions (Hansen and Singleton, 1982) and it means that, because past realizations
of variables in the information set underlying appointment decisions are not correlated with
the unexpected component of the error term, these variables are candidates for instrumental
variables for appointment decisions. This intuition allows us to use DPS-GMM to estimate
the relationship between female boardroom representation and risk.
In this study, we use the dynamic panel system GMM estimator proposed by Arellano
and Bover (1995) and Blundell and Bond (1998). As a system GMM estimator, the model is
estimated simultaneously in both levels and first differences. This improves the efficiency of
our estimator and the power of hypothesis tests by allowing more instrumental variables to be
included in the estimation (Roodman, 2009). Specifically, we assume that past endogenous
variables in levels are not correlated with the current residual terms in first differences (∆εi,t)
and that past variables in first differences are not correlated with the residual terms in levels
(εi,t).
Additionally, the estimator is accompanied by two tests that can be used to detect poten-
tial misspecification. The first test is a test of second order autocorrelation. Valid inferences
from DPS-GMM rely on the assumption that the model is dynamically complete (i.e. that
sufficient number of lags have been included). Therefore, no serial correlation should remain
in the error term16. Second, under DPS-GMM, more than one lag of past variables can be
used as instrumental variables. Therefore, we can use the test of overidentifying restrictions
(Hansen and Singleton, 1982) to test the null hypothesis that all instrumental variables are
jointly valid.
It is important to note that this identification strategy still relies on one strong as-
sumption: we assume that all time-varying factors that can influence female boardroom
16We look at the second order autocorrelation in the residuals at first difference as ∆εi,t = εi,t − εi,t−1 is
correlated with its first lag, ∆εi,t−1 = εi,t−1 − εi,t−2, by construction (through εi,t−1).
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representation and risk measures are either included in the model or that their influence
on female boardroom representation are channeled through past risk measures. Arguably, a
better strategy is to identify the relationship using a truly exogenous instrumental variable
for female boardroom representation. However, it is commonly accepted that finding a truly
exogenous instrumental variable is challenging. Section 5.3 shows some evidence that an
instrumental variable that is commonly used in the gender literature (the number of female
connections of male directors) is not truly exogenous to firm risk. Thus, in the absence of a
truly exogenous instrument, we try to identify the gender-risk relation using DPS-GMM.
4. Data and Variable Definitions
Our sample comprises observations (firm-years) with information available on the Risk-
Metrics, Compustat, Execucomp and CRSP databases. We obtain director-level data from
the RiskMetrics database which covers Standard & Poor’s (S&P) 500, S&P MidCaps and
S&P SmallCap firms. We then consolidate the data into firm-level variables. All variables
are defined in Table A1.
As dependent variables, we use three measures of equity risk: total risk, systematic risk
and idiosyncratic risk. Total risk is calculated as the standard deviation of daily stock returns
over the last year. Systematic risk is the coefficient on the stock market portfolio from a
market-model regression. We use the CRSP NYSE/AMEX/Nasdaq/Arca equally-weighted
index as a proxy for the stock market portfolio. Idiosyncratic risk is the standard deviation
of the residuals from the market model regression. All returns used for these calculations
exclude dividends. To annualize total and idiosyncratic standard deviations, we multiply
total and idiosyncratic risk by the square root of 250.
The proportion of women, our key independent variable, is defined as the number of
female directors on the board divided by the number of all directors.
As our empirical estimation assumes that the unobserved factors that influence both
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female boardroom representation and risk measures are constant across time, we rely on
prior literature to identify a comprehensive list of control variables in our risk equation.
This minimizes the chance that our findings are driven by time-variant omitted variable
bias.
We include various board characteristics as controls. We control for board size as decisions
made by a large board can lead to compromises and, as a result, less risky outcomes (Sah
and Stiglitz, 1986, 1991). We control for board independence as the presence of independent
directors can result in a more shareholder-focused board (Fama and Jensen, 1983) which
could lead to higher risk-taking. For directors to be classified as independent, they cannot
be executives (formerly or presently) and cannot have any other affiliation to the company.
We also control for the level of director connectedness (or “busyness”), as proxied by the
total number of additional directorships held by all directors. On one hand, multiple outside
directorships may inhibit a director’s ability to monitor (e.g. Fich and Shivdasani, 2007).
On the other hand, having other directorships is a signal of director ability (e.g. Masulis and
Mobbs, 2014). Both explanations suggest a relation between board connectedness and firm
value and one channel through which this may affect value can be firm risk.
We also control for various proxies of CEO risk incentives. Firm risk could be responsive
to the risk sensitivity of CEO compensation; thus, we control for CEO vega as well as delta17.
Vega is the dollar change in CEO compensation per 0.01 unit increase in a firm’s standard
deviation of stock returns. Delta is defined as the dollar change in compensation per 1%
increase in stock return. The calculation of vega and delta follows Core and Guay (2002)
and Coles et al. (2006). These two measures proxy for CEO pay incentives to take risk and
generate value, respectively. To control for CEO risk aversion, we also collect the length of
CEO tenure and the dollar amount of CEO cash compensation. Berger, Ofek, and Yermack
(1997) suggest that CEOs with long tenure are more entrenched and avoid risk-taking. A
higher amount of cash compensation means the CEOs can more easily diversify their wealth
17We thank Lalitha Naveen for providing a program for the calculation of compensation incentives and
data on her website.
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outside of the firm and, thus, are likely to be less risk averse (Guay, 1999). These variables
are calculated using Execucomp data.
Lastly, we control for a number of firm-level characteristics using financial accounting
variables obtained from the Compustat database. Firms with larger investment opportunity
sets and growth options may take more risk (Guay, 1999); therefore, we include the market-
to-book ratio, research and development expenditure (divided by total assets), capital ex-
penditure (divided by total assets) and sales growth (in log form) as proxies for investment
and growth opportunities.
The existing literature suggests that board characteristics are chosen based on the scope
and complexity of the firm, its monitoring needs and the bargaining power of the CEO
(e.g. Hermalin and Weisbach, 1998; Coles et al., 2008; Boone et al., 2007; Linck et al.,
2008). Therefore, we also control for the complexity and life stage of the firm using firm
size (as measured by the logarithm of the book value of total assets), firm age (in log
form) and revenue diversification (as measured by the Herfindahl-Hirschman index of revenue
concentration). Firm leverage is a also a proxy for firm complexity and also a determinant
of risk. On one hand, higher leverage may lead managers to take more risk as it incentivizes
them to transfer wealth from bondholders to shareholders (Leland, 1998). On the other hand,
a higher probability of facing financial distress may curb the firm’s tendency to engage in
risky activities (Friend and Lang, 1988).
We also include profitability and surplus cash as proxies for CEO bargaining power and
agency cost (Hermalin and Weisbach, 1998; Jensen, 1986). To alleviate the effect of outliers,
all control variables are winsorized at the 1st and 99th percentile values of the sample.
Our sample contains 13,581 observations (firm-years) of 1,960 firms between 1996-2010.
To avoid survivorship bias, we do not require a balanced panel. Following prior literature,
financial services and utility firms are excluded from our sample18. The descriptive statistics
of these variables are provided in Table 1.
18We analyze a sample of bank holding companies separately in Section 5.6.
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[Tables 1 about here]
About 63% of firms in our sample have at least one female director. On an average board
of nine directors, one director is a women, resulting in an average of 10% female boardroom
representation. We observe a high variation in firm and CEO characteristics, particularly in
total assets and CEO delta. To analyze the association between female boardroom repre-
sentation and these variables, Table 1 also calculates the mean of the dependent and control
variables for subsamples categorized by the number of female directors.
We find that female directors are more prevalent on larger and more independent boards.
This is expected as most female directors are appointed as independent directors. We also
find that firms with female directors are older, larger and have lower market values relative
to their book values. This suggests that mature firms are more likely to appoint female
directors. We also see the differences in CEO compensation packages conditional on the
number of female directors on the board.
We also observe negative monotonic relations between the number of female directors
and all three risk measures. To evaluate whether the difference in risk measures are sta-
tistically significant, we conduct a two-sample t-test (with unequal variances) between the
risk measures of firms with different numbers of female directors. The results (untabulated)
reveal that one additional female director tends to result in lower risk. However, the effect
generally decreases in both magnitude and statistical significance with the number of female
directors already on the board. On average, firms with at least one female director tend to
have lower total, systematic and idiosyncratic risk compared to firms without any female
directors. Again, the univariate results cannot rule out the possibility that the relationship
between female boardroom presentation and risk are influenced by other board and firm
characteristics.
Empirical specifications that only exploit within-firm variations such as DPS-GMM and
fixed effects may lead to hypothesis tests that are extremely underpowered when there is
little time-series variation in the data. In Table 2, we show the proportion of firms in our
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sample that change their board composition in each year. On average, about 11% of our
sample firms appoint or terminate female directors on their boards each year. In the whole
sample period, about 40% of the firms experience a change in number of women directors
on board at least once. The variation is much higher when we look at the change in the
proportion of women on board, which is the measure we use in our GMM and fixed effects
results. Between 29% and 38% of the firms experience a change in the proportion of women
on board (33% on average). More than half of the firms in our sample (55%) change their
level of gender diversity at least once by the end of the sample period. As comparisons,
we also tabulate the change in board size and board independence, which average at 40%
and 53% respectively. Although the change in gender diversity is lower than these two other
board characteristics, the frequency of changes is still not negligible. This suggests that there
is enough time-series variation in our key variables to effectively employ methodologies that
exploit within-firm variation such as DPS-GMM.
[Tables 2 about here]
5. Results
5.1. Does risk affect the appointment of female directors?
We argue that the dynamic model presented in this paper is suitable for estimating the
relationship between female boardroom representation and risk due to the presence of both
unobserved heterogeneity and the influence of past risk on the gender of appointed directors.
To confirm that this is the case, we focus on the firm-year observations where at least one
director is appointed and conduct a Probit estimation as per Equation 3 below.
Pr(Female Appointmenti,t = 1) = Φ(α0 + α1Riski,t−1 + Xi,t−1Γ + εi,t) (3)
The dependent variable, female appointment, is a dummy variable which is set to 1 when
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the appointed director is a women and 0 otherwise. Here the probability of a female director
appointment is modeled as normally distributed. The cumulative probability (denoted by
Φ) can be explained by past risk measures and a number of other variables as guided by
prior literature. Lack of access to what are predominantly all-male networks is widely seen
as one reason for the low number of female directors (Medland, 2004; Adams and Ferreira,
2009). In each board, we measure the extent of connectedness between male directors and
female directors in other firms. We control for the proportion of male directors with board
connections to women (i.e. the proportion of male directors who sit on the same board as at
least one female director in other firms). The more male directors have experience working
with female directors in other firms, the higher the likelihood that women would be brought
onto the board that male directors currently sit on. On average, 29% of male directors sit
on the same board as female directors in other firms. To measure the tendency of firms to
maintain the status quo in regards to gender diversity, we include two additional dummy
variables in the model – women departing the board and men departing the board. We also
include the proportion of women already on the board. Similar to Farrell and Hersch (2005)
and Gregory-Smith et al. (2014), we control for board size and board independence. We also
include firm-level determinants of board structure as documented by prior literature (Linck
et al., 2008; Coles et al., 2008).
[Table 3 about here]
Focusing on those firm-years where at least one director is appointed, we obtain 7,101
observations. Table 3 displays the results. There is evidence that firm risk influences the
gender choice in director appointments. The coefficient on the logarithm of the standard
deviation of stock returns is negative and significant at the 5% level.
The negative coefficient in our results suggests that riskier firms are less likely to appoint
female directors. This rules out the possibility that female directors are appointed to the
board to increase its monitoring intensity as it would mean a higher likelihood of female
director appointments when uncertainty surrounding the firm is high (i.e. a positive coeffi-
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cient). The negative coefficient is consistent with the group homogeneity argument of Kanter
(1977) i.e. more male-dominated boards are prevalent under high-uncertainty environments.
It is also consistent with the possibility that female directors prefer to work for less risky
firms (Farrell and Hersch, 2005).
The economic effect of risk on the probability of appointing a female director is small.
For an average firm, a 100% increase in total risk is associated with only a 4.50% decrease
in the probability that female directors are appointed. In addition, when we use the sys-
tematic and idiosyncratic components of firm risk, there is no evidence that these two risk
components affect the probability that a female director is appointed. Overall, our evidence
is only suggestive of the possibility that risk affects the gender of appointees to the board.
Nonetheless, the presence of some relationship means we cannot rule out the possibility of
reverse causality when testing whether female boardroom representation affects firm risk.
To rule out the possibility that the relation between risk and appointment is caused by
other time-invariant factors not included in the model, we also estimate Models 1-2 using
a linear probability model with firm-level fixed effects and find that the coefficient for total
risk remains significant. The coefficient for idiosyncratic risk also becomes significant but
only at 10% level.
The remaining results serve as evidence that there is a gender bias in the director appoint-
ment process. We find that firms are less likely to appoint female directors if they already
have a high proportion of female directors on their board, which could suggest tokenism.
Networking also plays a role as postulated by Adams and Ferreira (2009): the presence of
male directors who are more connected with female directors in other firms is associated
with a higher probability that a female director is appointed.
Finally, we find evidence consistent with a recruitment bias in favor of the status quo.
Women are more likely to be appointed when female directors departed the firm in the previ-
ous period. Overall, our results demonstrate that board appointments are not gender neutral
and show some evidence consistent with tokenism whereby boards seek to maintain a certain
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representation of women on boards without allowing an equal opportunity of appointment
to board positions.
5.2. Does female boardroom representation affect firm risk?
5.2.1. Dynamic panel GMM estimation
Considering the evidence that past risk influences the choice of selecting women into the
boardroom, we proceed with the estimation of the dynamic model in Equation 2. In our
baseline results, we include two lags of risk measures in the model.
The results using DPS-GMM are reported in Table 4. We find no evidence in support of
the view that female directors reduce equity risk. None of the coefficients for the proportion
of women are statistically significant. In addition, these coefficients are too small to have any
economic impact. For example, a 10% increase in female boardroom representation, which
is approximately equivalent to appointing one female director to an average-sized board of
nine directors, would lead to a 0.0031 unit increase in stock return beta. This is very small
considering that the average systematic risk in our sample is 1.276.
In Table 4, we also report the results of the two specification tests – the Hansen test of
overidentifying restrictions and the autocorrelation test. The results from the Hansen test
suggests that all orthogonality conditions specified in the model are valid; that is, past values
of board characteristics, firm characteristics and risk measures are exogenous. The AR(2)
tests also suggest no evidence of second-order autocorrelation in the residuals. Overall, the
specification tests reveal no evidence that the instruments used in identifying the relationship
between female boardroom representation and all three risk measures are endogenous.
[Table 4 about here]
5.2.2. Robustness checks
Our baseline results include two lags of the risk measures in the model and use two
further lags of risk measures and other variables as the instruments. The choice of lag length
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is made as a result of a trade-off between exogeneity and identification. The included lag
must be long enough to ensure that the model is dynamically complete such that further
information in the past is not related to the expectational error in the data. Yet information
too long in the past may not be sufficiently relevant to identify the parameters.
As robustness checks, we estimate models that include one, three and four lags instead
of two and still find no significant relation between the proportion of women and our risk
measures. Additionally, our results continue to hold when we use the data sampled every
two years instead of one. All these results are in Table A2.
5.2.3. Identifying the sources of endogeneity
The inferences from DPS-GMM suggest no relationship between female boardroom repre-
sentation and any of the three equity risk measures. However, the summary statistics suggest
that female directors are more prevalent in lower risk firms. We analyze further why this is
the case. There are three alternative explanations. The first explanation is that the inverse
relationship is driven by other observed factors such as board size, firm size or the level
of CEO compensation. The second explanation is that the relationship is driven by other
unobserved factors such as corporate culture or managerial ability. The third explanation is
that it is risk that influences female boardroom representation.
[Table 5 about here]
We distinguish between these three sources of endogeneity by estimating a static model
between female boardroom representation and risk using two estimators: OLS and a fixed
effects estimator. Both estimators would yield biased estimates under the presence of un-
observed heterogeneity and/or reverse causality. However, they can be useful in identifying
what causes the negative relation observed in the data. On one hand, if the relationship
is driven by other factors that we can observe in the sample, OLS estimates would yield
no significant relation between the proportion of women and risk measures once we include
these observable factors. On the other hand, if it is unobserved factors that influence the
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relation, their influences should be captured by the fixed effects. The results obtained from
the fixed effects estimator would still be asymptotically biased by the influence of past risk.
However, the magnitude of the estimation bias would depend on the strength of the influence
of past risk on current female boardroom representation.
Table 5 reports the OLS and fixed effects results. The OLS results (Columns 1-3) show
negative and significant relationships between the proportion of women on boards and total
risk as well as systematic risk. The coefficients are also much larger in magnitude compared
to the DPS-GMM results in Table 4. In the case of systematic risk for example, a 10%
increase in female boardroom representation is associated with a 0.035 unit decrease in the
market model beta. The statistically significant relation remains even after controlling for the
determinants of equity risk documented in the literature. The fixed effects results (Columns
4-6) on the other hand show no significant relationship between the proportion of women and
any of the three risk measures. All three coefficients are much closer to zero compared to the
OLS results whereas the standard errors remain similar for both sets of results. A comparison
between the OLS and the fixed effects results suggests that the negative relationships come
from unobservable sources of firm heterogeneity. The fixed effects estimator, which uses only
within-firm variation to identify the parameters, are not susceptible to unobserved differences
between the firms; therefore, the fixed effects estimates are not subject to the same bias that
drives the negative and significant coefficients of the OLS estimator.
To further analyze this, we conduct Sargan-Hansen tests to compare the estimations based
on fixed effects and those based on random effects. The null hypothesis of the Sargan-Hansen
test is that the random effects model, which uses both variation within and between firms,
estimates the same set of parameters as the fixed effects model which uses only variation
within firms. This is similar to the Durbin-Wu-Hausman specification test but is robust
under heteroskedasticity. The χ2-distributed test statistics (with 32 degrees of freedom)
are 432.696, 319.687 and 380.950 for the estimation of total, systematic and idiosyncratic
risk, respectively. We reject the null hypothesis in all three cases, suggesting that within-
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firm variation and between-firm variation produce statistically different sets of coefficient
estimates. This leads us to conclude that the negative relationship found in the OLS results
is indeed driven by time-invariant factors between firms.
As we have noted previously, the fixed effects estimator is not robust to the influence of
past risk on female boardroom representation. In this case, we find that, despite the influence
of risk on gender choice in the director appointment process, the fixed effects results yield
the same inference as DPS-GMM; that is, there is no significant relationship between female
boardroom representation and risk.
Considering all the evidence together, we conclude the following. Although we find that
low risk firms tend to have a higher proportion of female directors in their boardroom,
there is no robust evidence suggesting that higher female boardroom representation leads to
lower equity risk. There is suggestive evidence that firms take their existing risk profile into
account when deciding on the gender of new director appointments. However, any negative
association found between female directors and firm risk is most likely to be attributable to
other unobserved factors in a firm’s contracting environment such as corporate culture or
managerial ability. These unobserved factors may cause the spurious negative relationship as
they simultaneously influence firm risk and the proportion of female directors on the board.
5.3. Is ‘female connections of male directors’ a valid instrument?
Based on the rationale that the absence of women on boards is due to their lack of
social networks, Adams and Ferreira (2009) propose proxies for networks as instruments
for the proportion of female directors on board. One proxy that has been used in various
boardroom gender diversity studies (e.g. Adams and Ferreira, 2009; Levi et al., 2013; Gregory-
Smith et al., 2014) is the proportion of male directors with external connections to female
directors19. In this section, we present evidence that this instrument is not valid in our
19This variable is constructed by computing the proportion of male directors who are connected to female
directors. Male directors are connected if they sit on other boards and one of these boards has at least one
female director. This variable is assumed to be exogenous because the fact that male directors know women
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examination of firm risk. We do so in two steps. In a first step, we show that the statistical
significance of both the instrument and the proportion of female directors critically depend
on the control variables included in our models. In a second step, we cast doubt on the
exogeneity of the instrument using formal tests in an overidentified model.
We start the analysis in this section by presenting two-stage least squares results with
fixed effects and one variation in the controls20. Since instrumental variable estimation is
biased if an omitted explanator that belongs in the model is correlated with the instrumental
variable, we have been careful to control for the connectedness of the board in our main
analysis. However, there are other ways to proxy for board connectedness and therefore
we include an alternative measure in our regressions. The results are presented in Table
6. We note that the control variables in Panel A are the same as in the baseline model.
In Panel B, we replace director connectedness with male director connectedness, which is
defined as the total number of external board seats held by male directors. We find that the
conclusions critically depend on the employed measure of board connectedness21. Despite a
high correlation of 0.968 between the two measures of board connectedness, Panel A does
not report a significant relationship between female representation and risk measures, but
Panel B reports that female board representation reduces risk (significant at 5% level)22.
These findings provide a first indication that female connections of male directors is not a
suitable instrument in our study of firm risk and motivate us to conduct further tests in
regards to the exogeneity of the instrument.
[Table 6 about here]
from their other directorship should not have any relation to firm performance or risk. At the same time,
if male directors on the board know more female directors, there is a higher likelihood that more female
directors will be appointed. Thus, they argue that the identification assumption is satisfied.
20As the estimation may not be consistent due to unobserved factors that are present in both the first
and second stage equations (Cornwell, Schmidt, and Wyhowski, 1992), we time-demean all the variables
including the instrument in both stages to remove unobserved time-invariant factors.
21We also re-estimate our GMM results using male director connectedness as a control variable. The
results (in Panel F of Table A2) are consistent with our other results.
22In addition, the strength of the instrument in the first stage also depends on the included variable. The
instrument enters the model significantly only when male director connectedness is used as a control variable
(Panel B). The Kleibergen-Papp Wald statistic also suggests that the instrument is weak in Panel A (1.986
against the 25% critical value of 5.53).
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Exactly identified models posit a challenge to testing the validity of the instrument be-
cause the standard way to test for instrument exogeneity, i.e. the Hansen test for overi-
dentifying restrictions, requires that the number of instruments is larger than the number
of endogenous variables23. Therefore, we overidentify our model by using a second proxy
for female networks that was originally proposed by Adams and Ferreira (2009), i.e. the
proportion of male directors’ board seats in other firms with female directors. The original
instrument counts the number of directors, i.e. the number of male directors with external
connection to women divided by the number of directors, whereas this alternative variation
counts the number of external board seats, i.e. the number of male directors’ external board
seats in firms with female directors divided by the total number of external board seats. The
correlation coefficient between the two instruments is 0.604.
Under the null hypothesis of the overidentification test, the instruments are jointly exoge-
nous and therefore should estimate similar coefficients for the endogenous variable. Rejecting
the null hypothesis implies that at least one of the instrumental variables is not exogenous.
We exploit the fact that this test is weak when instruments bias the results in the same
direction. Specifically, because similar instruments lead to similar coefficients for the en-
dogenous variables a rejection of the validity of these similar instruments would be a strong
test against strict exogeneity (Murray, 2006). Additionally, because the instruments are
similar, the rejection of the null would also give evidence against the exogeneity of both
instruments.
[Table 7 about here]
Table 7 presents some evidence against instrument exogeneity. In Panel A, we estimate
models that rely on the alternative instrument only (i.e., the models are exactly-identified).
We find that the relationship between gender and risk in the second-stage regressions flips
signs and is now positive. Finding the opposite results when using a related alternative
23For example, although in unreported results we find that female board connections enters the risk
regression significantly in both OLS and fixed effects (a valid instrument cannot be itself an explanatory
variable), a standard t-test is invalid given that the residuals are biased.
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instrument casts further doubt on the validity of female connections of male directors as
an instrument for female board participation. We then combine the two instruments in
overidentified models in Panel B. We find that the relation between gender and risk is not
statistically significant in any of the models. Additionally, the Hansen test statistics lead us
to reject the null hypothesis that the instruments are jointly exogenous.
Taken together, our results indicate that the connection of male directors to other women
directors is not a valid instrument, at least in our setting where risk measures are used as
the dependent variable.
5.4. Alternative identification strategy - DID matching estimator
The failure to detect any gender-risk relationship could be caused by the fact that the
proportion of female directors might not be an appropriate measure. Figure 2 shows a line
plot of the proportion of female directors on boards over time. We observe that changes in
female boardroom representation come from two sources of variation. First, the increase in
the number of female directors on boards and, second, the decrease in overall board size. It
is evident from Figure 1 that during our sampling period average board size has decreased
faster than the rate at which the number of female directors has increased. We also observe
in Table 2 that the change in the proportion of female directors on boards is mainly driven by
the change in board size whereas new appointments and departures of female directors affect
about 10% of firms each year. Therefore, in this section we use a difference-in-difference
matching estimator to focus on the incidents where changes in gender diversity come from
female director appointments.
[Figures 1 about here]
The difference-in-difference matching estimator is a combination of the difference-in-
difference estimator (DID) and the matching estimator. DID exploits the ’parallel trends’
assumption; that is, two similar firms are likely to follow the same change without any
treatment. Therefore, if the treatment has any impact on the outcome, the impact should
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be reflected in the difference between the changes of the two firms (Roberts and Whited,
2011). The DID estimator can be implemented by estimating the following equation.
Riski,t = α0 + α1(Female Appointment)i,t × (Post Period)i,t
+α2(Female Appointment)i,t + α3(Post Period)i,t
+CONTROLi,tΓ + εi,t (4)
The variable female appointment is a dummy variable which takes the value of one when
the firm is in the treatment group and zero when the firm is in the control group. Another
dummy variable, post period, takes the value of zero in the time period before the treatment
and one in the post-treatment period. Included control variables are the same as the DPS-
GMM specifications in Table 4.
Often, a change in board structure reflects other changes in the organization such as
corporate restructuring, mergers and acquisitions, or a large shift in strategy. All these
changes are likely to have an impact on risk. We try to alleviate these concerns in two ways.
First, we select our treatment group such that it excludes director appointments that are
likely to result from a change in strategy. To be included in the treatment group, the firm
must only appoint one female director in that year to replace a departing male director. We
require that the departing director must be older than 60 years24. Applying these criteria, we
are able to identify 153 female director appointments for our treatment group. Second, we
match these treatment firms to similar control firms. We identify 737 control observations
that appoint one male director in that year to replace another departing male director. The
departing director in our control firms also must be older than 60 years. We then match
treatment and control firms using their propensity to replace a departing male director with
a female director25.
24This ensures that director turnover is more likely to be caused by retirement than by shareholders forcing
out a director over dissatisfaction with the firm.
25The propensity scores of these observations are computed based on Model 1 in Table 3. We employ
matching with replacement and require that the difference in the propensity scores of treatment and matched
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In addition to propensity score matching, we also employ the nearest-neighbor matching
method in order to include all our treatment firms in the estimation. We use the matching
procedure of Abadie, Drukker, Herr, and Imbens (2004) and use variables from Model 1 in
Table 3 as our matching covariates. We match each treatment firm with its four nearest
neighbors.
The difference-in-difference results using both matching techniques are reported in Table
8. We find that the average difference in risk measures across the two periods of firms
with female director appointments is not statistically different from those firms that do not
experience any change in board structure (i.e. we fail to reject the null hypothesis that
the coefficients for (Female Appointment)i,t× (Post Period)i,t are statistically different from
zero). Our results are consistent across all three risk measures and both matching procedures.
[Table 8 about here]
As robustness checks, we also perform propensity-score matching DID using various levels
of restrictions (see Table A4). We expand the number of matches by relaxing the propensity
score restriction from 5% to 10% where we are able to match 112 out of 153 firms. More
relaxed restrictions leads to more firms to be included in the estimation but it means that
the control firms may be too dissimilar to our treatments. Therefore, we also estimate the
model where the propensity score restriction is set to 2%, 1% and 0.5%. We end up with
79, 65 and 43 matched firms respectively. All these results confirm our 5% baseline results
that there is no statistically significant change in risk after a male director is replaced by a
female director.
Similarly for the nearest neighbor matching procedure, there is a trade-off between effi-
ciency gain from using multiple matches and including too dissimilar firms in the estimation.
Therefore, we also vary the number of matches for each treatment firm from 4 to 1, 2, 3, 5
and 6 and confirm our baseline results. Overall, although we find in the sample that on av-
erage firms with a larger proportion of female directors on board have lower equity risk, the
firms does not exceed 5%. We are able to match 103 observations in the treatment group to at least one
control observation.
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empirical evidence does not support the notion that greater female boardroom representation
leads to lower firm risk.
However, the risk measures employed so far in this study are based on stock price in-
formation. Market-based risk measures, similar to profitability measures, are also functions
of many other factors than board, CEO and firm characteristics. Any relationship between
board composition and firm outcomes may therefore be difficult to detect (Hermalin and
Weisbach, 2003). The limitations of stock price information as a proxy for risk motivate us
to consider corporate risk-taking actions that are reflected in accounting information in the
next section.
5.5. Alternative measures of firm risk
Although we report no evidence that links boardroom gender diversity to equity risk,
gender difference in risk appetite may still be reflected in firm policies. That is, a more
gender-balanced board may act differently from a more male-dominated board in terms
of risk-taking behavior even though these differences cannot be detected in a firm’s stock
volatility. Therefore, we explore various corporate risk-taking policies and investigate their
relationship with boardroom gender diversity.
One function of the board is to determine remuneration policies in a way that they align
CEO incentives with a company’s objectives. If female directors differ in terms of risk-taking
tolerance and behavior, this may also be revealed in the compensation packages that gender
diverse boards offer to the CEO. We investigate the link between gender diversity and CEO
risk-taking incentives, proxied by CEO vega. Vega measures the sensitivity of compensation
to risk taking (as the change in compensation per 0.01 unit increase in the standard deviation
of stock returns). In addition to other board characteristics (board size, board independence
and director connectedness), we follow Coles et al. (2006) and include CEO delta, cash
compensation, various firm characteristics and firm total risk as control variables.
We also investigate the relation between gender diversity and the following corporate risk-
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taking policies: R&D expenditure, diversification and leverage. R&D spending is considered
risky as the payoffs are highly uncertain ex ante. Thus, gender diversity could have some
relation to the level of R&D spending after controlling for its other determinants. Futher, a
less diversified range of revenue sources means a firm’s turnover is likely to be more sensitive
to demand for fewer products. Thus, more diversified firms are considered less risky. We
use the Herfindhal-Hirschman index for revenue concentration to measure the degree of
diversification26. Lastly, higher leverage can also be considered risky. Leverage is measured
by the debt-to-equity ratio using the book value of firm equity. Control variables for these
estimations follow prior literature (see e.g. Coles et al., 2006).
Finally, we use an alternative proxy of firm risk based on operating performance. The
variable S.D.(ROA) is constructed as the standard deviation of firm return on assets in the
next five years. Control variables for the S.D.(ROA) equation are the same as for our model
of equity risk measures.
[Table 9 about here]
The first column of Table 9 shows no statistically significant relation between the propor-
tion of women and CEO Vega. We also explore the relationship between CEO compensation
and the proportion of female directors on the compensation committee and find no evidence
that female representation affects compensation.
The remainder of Table 9 shows the estimated relation between gender diversity and
various risk-taking policy measures. Female boardroom representation cannot explain the
variation in any of risk-relevant firm policies, except for the level of diversification where it is
significant at 10% level. We also do not find any significant relation between the proportion
of women and the standard deviation of return on assets. Overall, female boardroom rep-
resentation does not appear to have much impact on risk policies nor the accounting-based
measure of risk.
26We also use number of business segments (in log form) as a proxy for diversification and find qualitatively
similar results.
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5.6. Are banks different? Evidence from bank holding companies
In this section, we analyze a sample of bank holding companies (BHCs) which as custom-
ary in most governance studies have not been included in the main analysis. This sample
comprises 138 BHCs (881 observations) with data available on RiskMetrics, Compustat,
Execucomp and CRSP. This analysis allows us to compare our results with prior works on
gender diversity in bank boards (e.g. Adams and Ragunathan, 2013).
Table 10 reports ordinary least squares, fixed effects and dynamic panel estimates of
equity risk measures on the proportion of female directors and control variables. We include
the same set of board characteristics and CEO risk-taking incentives as in our main analysis
and add several BHC characteristics. We include bank size as proxied by the logarithm of
total assets to control for bank complexity and the ability to absorb risk. We control for
(the logarithm of) asset growth (Berger et al., 2014) and charter value as proxied by Tobin’s
Q (Morrison and White, 2005). We also control for differences in the balance sheet and
asset composition by using the ratios of loans and deposits to assets and the proportion of
bank loans that are non-performing. Finally, we include the tier-1 capital adequacy ratio to
control for moral hazard and monitoring incentives (Keeley, 1990).
Our results regarding the effect of gender diversity on risk in BHCs are the same as those
for our main sample. We find no statistically significant relation between the proportion of
women directors and risk in any specification.
6. Conclusion
Many US firms are under increasing public pressure to embrace more gender diversity
in the boardroom. Although there presently is no mandatory gender quota in the US, SEC
disclosure rules and pressure from various firm stakeholder groups are likely to nudge US
firms towards appointing a greater proportion of female directors in the near future. As the
level of female participation on boards of directors increases, the current literature provides
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only limited and inconsistent evidence regarding the economic impact that higher female
representation might bring to the firm.
Drawing on 15 years of data and almost 2,000 firms, our study contributes to this debate
by investigating the relationship between boardroom gender diversity and equity risk. We
show that female boardroom representation is a choice that boards make, and that firm risk
influences this choice. We then demonstrate that after controlling for two sources of endo-
geneity – unobserved heterogeneity and reverse causality – there is no evidence that female
boardroom representation affects any of the equity risk measures included in this study.
Associations between gender diversity and risk are found to be driven by unobserved hetero-
geneity that influences both the gender composition of a board and a firm’s risk measures.
Consistent with our finding that the gender make-up of the board does not affect equity risk,
we also show that neither a range of firm policy measures nor an operating measure of risk
are affected by female board representation.
Our main conclusion is straightforward. A board with a higher proportion of female
directors is no more or less risk-taking than a more male-dominated board. This result
hinges on careful identification of the causal relationship between director gender and firm
risk. A key implication of our paper, therefore, is that studies which attempt to link the
demographic characteristics of corporate decision-makers to firm outcomes have to carefully
consider how to causally isolate firm outcomes from between-firm heterogeneous factors that
influence both the demographic characteristics in the boardroom and the firm outcomes.
Empirical set-ups which are unable to distinguish between the two will lead to biased results
and policy conclusions which are not empirically justified.
Ultimately, the case for gender diversity on corporate boards rests on a sense of fairness
rather than on pure economic considerations or what in essence could be called the business
case for more gender diversity. The lack of strong empirical evidence on the relationship
between gender diversity and risk, therefore, does not make gender diversity any more or
less desirable. Still, our results point to a gender bias in the director appointment process.
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Discriminatory practices in the recruitment of directors should attract scrutiny by regulators.
Since we find evidence of gender bias in the director recruitment process, our results at first
glance support mandatory gender quotas. However, we have to consider the possibility
that firms’ existing board characteristics are already optimal given a firms’s internal and
external environments. Thus, regulations such as a gender quota could cause a deviation
from optimality that may have an adverse impact on firm value. Consistent with this, Ahern
and Dittmar (2012) show value losses around the implementation of a gender quota law in
Norway. Therefore, regulations around increased diversity disclosure and demands for more
diversity by outside stakeholders offer a more cautious approach of encouraging firms to
bring more gender diversity to their boardrooms.
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Table 1: Summary Statistics
This table reports summary statistics for the full sample and subsamples by the number of women on board. The sample comprises 13,581
observations (firm-years) from 1,960 firms between 1996-2010. Board characteristics are obtained from the RiskMetrics database. CEO risk-taking
incentives are computed using data from Execucomp. Firm characteristics are obtained from Compustat and risk measures are computed using
price data from the Center for Research in Security Prices. CEO risk-taking incentives and firm characteristics are winsorized at the 1st and 99th
percentile values. All variables are defined in Table A1.
Full Sample Number of Women on Board
Mean S.D. p25 p50 p75 0 1 2 3 4 – 6
Board Characteristics
Firms with At Least One Women 0.628 0.483 0.000 1.000 1.000
Number of Women 0.938 0.925 0.000 1.000 1.000
Proportion of Women 0.096 0.092 0.000 0.100 0.143
Board Size 9.098 2.386 7.000 9.000 11.000 7.665 9.392 10.638 11.251 12.506
Board Independence 0.687 0.171 0.571 0.714 0.833 0.640 0.696 0.737 0.768 0.753
Director Connectedness 5.805 5.920 2.000 4.000 8.000 2.961 6.490 8.797 9.888 10.976
Male Director Connectedness 5.040 5.119 1.000 4.000 7.000 2.961 5.755 7.080 7.279 6.792
Proportion of Male Directors with Board 0.290 0.243 0.111 0.250 0.444 0.168 0.327 0.405 0.464 0.479
Connections to Women
CEO Risk-Taking Incentives
CEO Vega 0.145 0.227 0.022 0.063 0.164 0.081 0.141 0.222 0.336 0.363
CEO Delta 0.728 1.622 0.095 0.245 0.641 0.604 0.700 0.959 0.946 1.024
CEO Tenure 6.924 7.513 2.000 5.000 10.000 8.121 6.654 5.547 5.226 5.976
CEO Cash Compensation 1.218 1.012 0.605 0.922 1.430 0.908 1.260 1.593 1.790 1.671
Firm Characteristics
Market-to-Book 2.027 1.266 1.244 1.624 2.314 2.074 1.986 2.036 1.959 1.946
R&D Expenditure 0.046 0.091 0.000 0.004 0.050 0.064 0.041 0.030 0.022 0.019
Capital Expenditure 0.069 0.111 0.021 0.038 0.068 0.086 0.064 0.053 0.045 0.046
Leverage 0.215 0.169 0.062 0.208 0.327 0.192 0.219 0.244 0.237 0.270
Ln(Total Assets) 7.398 1.482 6.330 7.246 8.325 6.670 7.533 8.184 8.738 8.717
Return on Assets 0.044 0.098 0.020 0.054 0.091 0.033 0.047 0.054 0.059 0.058
Ln(1+Sales Growth) 0.090 0.237 0.001 0.082 0.177 0.116 0.084 0.063 0.052 0.058
Surplus Cash 0.092 0.097 0.038 0.082 0.136 0.091 0.093 0.091 0.089 0.082
Net PP&E 0.283 0.215 0.116 0.224 0.398 0.272 0.291 0.286 0.289 0.288
Dividends 0.527 0.499 0.000 1.000 1.000 0.356 0.569 0.704 0.768 0.839
Firm Age 25.975 16.170 12.000 21.000 40.000 19.537 27.329 32.751 37.456 36.589
Diversification 0.718 0.406 0.461 0.745 1.000 0.770 0.718 0.640 0.630 0.674
Risk Measures
Total Risk 0.451 0.214 0.303 0.400 0.545 0.516 0.429 0.393 0.372 0.372
Systematic Risk 1.276 0.644 0.839 1.186 1.600 1.452 1.222 1.116 1.003 0.986
Idiosyncratic Risk 0.393 0.191 0.262 0.348 0.476 0.453 0.373 0.337 0.317 0.319
S.D.(ROA) 0.055 0.094 0.015 0.028 0.058 0.068 0.051 0.041 0.039 0.040
Observations 13,581 5,056 5,228 2,603 526 168
% of Full Sample 100% 37% 38% 19% 4% 1%
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Table 2: Change in Board Variables Over Time
This table displays the proportion of firms in the sample that change their number of women on board,
proportion of women on board, board size and board independence over any one-year period between 1996-
2010. The results are based on a sample of 1,960 firms (13,581 firm-years) from the RiskMetrics database.
Change in
Number Proportion Board Board # Firms
Year of Women of Women Size Independence (Firm-Years)
1997 7.61% 29.39% 37.24% 50.23% 854
1998 9.61% 30.60% 40.69% 54.80% 843
1999 9.72% 29.86% 36.46% 51.85% 864
2000 11.58% 29.98% 38.74% 52.38% 924
2001 11.86% 30.21% 39.69% 54.02% 970
2002 11.46% 31.48% 40.25% 52.63% 969
2003 13.60% 35.38% 45.30% 60.22% 978
2004 14.24% 36.18% 45.15% 59.39% 948
2005 13.06% 36.72% 43.79% 56.00% 934
2006 12.60% 37.53% 42.82% 55.96% 738
2007 10.49% 28.54% 32.53% 46.07% 953
2008 12.63% 35.11% 41.68% 49.08% 974
2009 11.24% 34.95% 43.61% 50.62% 970
2010 10.80% 32.82% 37.35% 44.55% 972
Average 11.46% 32.77% 40.38% 52.70% 921
1997-2010
Percentage of Firms 40.26% 54.59% 74.80% 80.36% 1,960
Percentage of Firm-Years 10.92% 31.09% 38.34% 49.97% (13,581)
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Table 3: Determinants of Gender in Director Appointments
The dependent variable, Female Appointment, is a dummy variable which equals one when women directors
are appointed and zero otherwise. Columns 1-2 reports results from probit regressions and Columns 3-4
reports results from a linear probability model with firm-level fixed effects. The sample includes all firm-
years where at least one director is appointed. Cluster-robust standard errors are reported in parentheses.
All independent variables are lagged by one period. All specifications include year fixed effects. Columns
1-2 include industry fixed effects based on two-digit NAICS code. Intercepts are included but not reported.
*, **, *** denote statistical significance at 10%, 5% and 1% respectively.
Dependent Variable = Female Appointment
Probit Fixed Effects
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Total Risk −0.168∗∗ −0.060∗
(0.073) (0.035)
Systematic Risk −0.041 0.007
(0.045) (0.019)
Idiosyncratic Risk −0.112 −0.072∗
(0.085) (0.037)
Women Departing the Board 0.688∗∗∗ 0.688∗∗∗ 0.237∗∗∗ 0.237∗∗∗
(0.068) (0.068) (0.027) (0.027)
Men Departing the Board −0.049 −0.050 −0.011 −0.010
(0.041) (0.041) (0.015) (0.015)
Proportion of Male Directors with Board 0.229∗∗ 0.230∗∗ 0.037 0.037
Connections to Women (0.104) (0.104) (0.056) (0.056)
Proportion of Women −2.721∗∗∗ −2.726∗∗∗ −3.401∗∗∗ −3.398∗∗∗
(0.325) (0.324) (0.159) (0.158)
Board Size 0.011 0.011 −0.023∗∗∗ −0.023∗∗∗
(0.011) (0.011) (0.007) (0.007)
Board Independence 0.156 0.156 0.110 0.111
(0.130) (0.130) (0.073) (0.073)
Ln(Total Assets) 0.079∗∗∗ 0.081∗∗∗ 0.063∗∗ 0.061∗∗
(0.019) (0.019) (0.026) (0.026)
Market-to-Book 0.039∗∗ 0.041∗∗ 0.010 0.009
(0.018) (0.018) (0.009) (0.009)
R&D Expenditure −0.356 −0.340 −0.162 −0.173
(0.315) (0.316) (0.226) (0.225)
Capital Expenditure −0.311 −0.302 −0.054 −0.064
(0.242) (0.243) (0.121) (0.122)
Leverage −0.034 −0.038 −0.089 −0.086
(0.139) (0.139) (0.079) (0.079)
Return on Assets −0.105 −0.112 −0.110 −0.111
(0.266) (0.266) (0.107) (0.107)
Observations 7,101 7,101 7,101 7,101
R2 0.059 0.059 0.401 0.401
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Table 4: Risk Measures on Female Boardroom Representation (DPS-GMM)
This table reports two-step Dynamic Panel System GMM estimations of risk measures on the proportion of
women on board and control variables. All models include year dummy variables. All independent variables
are treated as endogenous except Ln(1+Firm Age) and year dummy variables. Endogenous variables are in-
strumented by two of their past values. In parentheses are finite-sample robust standard errors (Windmeijer,
2005). The null hypothesis for the Hansen test of overidentification is that all instruments are exogenous.
AR(1) and AR(2) are test statistics for the null hypothesis that there is no serial correlation of order 1 and
2 in the first-difference residuals. ∗ , ∗∗ , ∗∗∗ denote statistical significance at 10%, 5% and 1% respectively.
Risk Measure = Total Risk Systematic Risk Idiosyncratic Risk
(1) (2) (3)
Proportion of Women 0.075 −0.743 0.134
(0.157) (0.566) (0.168)
Board Size 0.018∗ 0.023 0.015
(0.011) (0.034) (0.012)
Board Independence 0.169 0.482 0.062
(0.132) (0.403) (0.147)
Director Connectedness −0.004 −0.016 −0.004
(0.004) (0.013) (0.004)
CEO Vega −0.065 −0.036 −0.098
(0.068) (0.245) (0.070)
CEO Delta 0.016 0.024 0.008
(0.015) (0.045) (0.016)
CEO Tenure 0.002 −0.008 0.003
(0.002) (0.006) (0.002)
CEO Cash Compensation −0.036∗ 0.081 −0.005
(0.022) (0.066) (0.022)
Market-to-Book 0.039 0.139 0.037
(0.029) (0.095) (0.030)
R&D Expenditure 0.234 −0.527 0.277
(0.419) (0.928) (0.424)
Capital Expenditure −0.246 −0.090 −0.279
(0.261) (0.683) (0.297)
Ln(1+Sales Growth) 0.147∗ 0.178 0.078
(0.081) (0.196) (0.085)
Leverage −0.232∗∗ −0.824∗∗ −0.201∗∗
(0.098) (0.342) (0.102)
Ln(Total Assets) −0.039∗ −0.068 −0.043∗∗
(0.021) (0.053) (0.022)
Ln(1+Firm Age) 0.046∗∗ −0.021 0.022
(0.021) (0.056) (0.023)
Diversification 0.184 −0.240 0.172
(0.119) (0.199) (0.111)
Return on Assets −1.443∗∗∗ −0.326 −1.708∗∗∗
(0.409) (0.784) (0.438)
Surplus Cash −0.448 −2.384∗∗ −0.247
(0.491) (1.166) (0.459)
Risk Measure (Lag 1) 0.451∗∗∗ 0.281 0.512∗∗∗
(0.114) (0.178) (0.130)
Risk Measure (Lag 2) 0.163∗ 0.264∗ 0.046
(0.091) (0.136) (0.099)
Observations 8,629 8,629 8,629
Hansen (df=38) 44.032 36.489 45.202
AR(1) −4.557∗∗∗ −2.365∗∗ −4.549∗∗∗
AR(2) −1.072 −1.029 0.124
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Table 5: Risk Measures on Female Boardroom Representation (OLS and Firm-Level Fixed Effects)
This table reports ordinary least squares (OLS) and firm-level fixed effects estimations of risk measures on proportion of women and control variables.
Cluster-robust standard errors are reported in parentheses. All models include year dummy variables. OLS models also include industry dummy
variables based on two-digit NAICS code. Within-cluster heteroskedasticity and serial correlation robust standard errors are reported in parentheses.
Intercepts are included but not reported. ∗ , ∗∗ , ∗∗∗ denote statistical significance at 10%, 5% and 1% respectively.
Panel A: Ordinary Least Squares Panel B: Firm-level Fixed Effects
Risk Measure = Total Systematic Idiosyncratic Total Systematic Idiosyncratic
Risk Risk Risk Risk Risk Risk
Proportion of Women −0.123∗∗ −0.351∗∗∗ −0.085 0.032 −0.030 0.056
(0.052) (0.089) (0.053) (0.065) (0.121) (0.065)
Board Size −0.015∗∗∗ −0.030∗∗∗ −0.013∗∗∗ −0.008∗∗∗ −0.018∗∗∗ −0.008∗∗∗
(0.003) (0.004) (0.003) (0.003) (0.005) (0.003)
Board Independence 0.003 0.012 0.006 −0.017 0.006 −0.025
(0.030) (0.054) (0.030) (0.031) (0.063) (0.030)
Director Connectedness −0.002∗∗ −0.003 −0.002∗ 0.002 0.002 0.002∗
(0.001) (0.002) (0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (0.001)
CEO Vega −0.101∗∗∗ −0.307∗∗∗ −0.074∗∗∗ −0.159∗∗∗ −0.300∗∗∗ −0.146∗∗∗
(0.023) (0.044) (0.022) (0.024) (0.041) (0.023)
CEO Delta 0.012∗∗∗ 0.019∗∗∗ 0.011∗∗∗ 0.008∗∗ 0.005 0.009∗∗∗
(0.003) (0.006) (0.003) (0.003) (0.006) (0.003)
CEO Tenure −0.000 0.000 −0.000 0.001∗∗ 0.003∗∗ 0.001
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
CEO Cash Compensation −0.001 −0.012 0.003 −0.014∗∗∗ −0.023∗∗∗ −0.012∗∗∗
(0.005) (0.008) (0.004) (0.004) (0.008) (0.004)
Market-to-Book 0.006 0.065∗∗∗ 0.001 0.018∗∗∗ 0.108∗∗∗ 0.006
(0.004) (0.010) (0.004) (0.004) (0.009) (0.004)
R&D Expenditure 0.494∗∗∗ 1.252∗∗∗ 0.486∗∗∗ −0.269∗∗∗ 0.384 −0.357∗∗∗
(0.060) (0.143) (0.060) (0.094) (0.233) (0.089)
Capital Expenditure 0.017 0.271∗∗∗ −0.015 0.026 0.426∗∗∗ −0.030
(0.045) (0.092) (0.045) (0.055) (0.118) (0.051)
Ln(1+Sales Growth) 0.072∗∗∗ 0.127∗∗∗ 0.082∗∗∗ 0.049∗∗∗ 0.088∗∗∗ 0.053∗∗∗
(0.015) (0.028) (0.015) (0.014) (0.025) (0.014)
Leverage −0.044 −0.306∗∗∗ −0.002 0.092∗∗ −0.019 0.130∗∗∗
(0.031) (0.057) (0.031) (0.041) (0.084) (0.040)
Ln(Total Assets) −0.047∗∗∗ 0.037∗∗∗ −0.063∗∗∗ −0.065∗∗∗ 0.050∗∗ −0.088∗∗∗
(0.005) (0.010) (0.005) (0.013) (0.024) (0.013)
Ln(1+Firm Age) −0.078∗∗∗ −0.076∗∗∗ −0.088∗∗∗ −0.336∗∗∗ −0.596∗∗∗ −0.262∗∗∗
(0.009) (0.016) (0.009) (0.037) (0.071) (0.035)
Diversification 0.012 −0.020 0.023∗ 0.006 −0.009 0.007∗
(0.009) (0.014) (0.013) (0.004) (0.011) (0.004)
Return on Assets −0.993∗∗∗ −1.224∗∗∗ −1.007∗∗∗ −0.531∗∗∗ −0.610∗∗∗ −0.548∗∗∗
(0.048) (0.104) (0.050) (0.045) (0.093) (0.046)
Surplus Cash −0.166∗∗∗ −0.579∗∗∗ −0.101∗∗ −0.174∗∗∗ −0.544∗∗∗ −0.131∗∗∗
(0.053) (0.131) (0.050) (0.040) (0.093) (0.041)
Observations 13,581 13,581 13,581 13,581 13,581 13,581
R2 0.595 0.327 0.596 0.613 0.205 0.595
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Table 6: Instrumental Variable Regressions with Firm-Level Fixed Effects
This table reports two-stage least squares regressions with firm-level fixed effects of firm equity risk measures on the proportion of women on board and
control variables. Proportion of women is treated as endogenous and is instrumented using the proportion of male directors with board connections
to female directors. Director connectedness is defined as the average number of external board seats held by a director. Male director connectedness
is defined as the average number of external board seats held by a male director. Other control variables are defined in Table A1. All dependent and
independent variables are time-demeaned in both first-stage and second-stage regressions. All models include year dummy variables. Within-cluster
heteroskedasticity and serial correlation robust standard errors are reported in parentheses. Intercepts are included but not reported. ∗ , ∗∗ , ∗∗∗
denote statistical significance at 10%, 5% and 1% respectively.
(A) Including Director Connectedness (B) Including Male Director Connectedness
Proportion Total Systematic Idiosyncratic Proportion Total Systematic Idiosyncratic
of Women Risk Risk Risk of Women Risk Risk Risk
Proportion of Women −6.734 −9.885 −6.780 −1.063∗∗ −1.880∗∗ −1.076∗∗
(5.352) (8.729) (5.320) (0.479) (0.946) (0.473)
Board Size 0.000 −0.008 −0.018∗∗ −0.009 0.003∗∗∗ −0.005∗ −0.014∗∗∗ −0.006∗∗
(0.001) (0.006) (0.009) (0.006) (0.001) (0.003) (0.006) (0.003)
Board Independence 0.066∗∗∗ 0.432 0.660 0.428 0.068∗∗∗ 0.065 0.141 0.059
(0.008) (0.360) (0.584) (0.358) (0.008) (0.047) (0.092) (0.047)
CEO Vega 0.005 −0.124∗∗ −0.249∗∗∗ −0.110∗∗ 0.002 −0.155∗∗∗ −0.292∗∗∗ −0.141∗∗∗
(0.006) (0.054) (0.085) (0.054) (0.006) (0.024) (0.042) (0.024)
CEO Delta 0.000 0.009 0.007 0.010 0.000 0.008∗∗ 0.005 0.009∗∗
(0.001) (0.007) (0.011) (0.007) (0.001) (0.004) (0.006) (0.004)
CEO Tenure −0.000 0.000 0.001 −0.000 −0.000 0.001 0.003∗∗ 0.001
(0.000) (0.002) (0.003) (0.002) (0.000) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
CEO Cash Compensation 0.000 −0.013 −0.022 −0.011 0.000 −0.013∗∗∗ −0.022∗∗∗ −0.011∗∗
(0.001) (0.008) (0.013) (0.008) (0.001) (0.005) (0.008) (0.005)
Market-to-Book 0.000 0.021∗∗ 0.113∗∗∗ 0.009 0.001 0.019∗∗∗ 0.110∗∗∗ 0.007
(0.001) (0.008) (0.015) (0.008) (0.001) (0.004) (0.010) (0.004)
R&D Expenditure −0.050∗∗ −0.604∗ −0.104 −0.695∗∗ −0.052∗∗ −0.322∗∗∗ 0.295 −0.411∗∗∗
(0.024) (0.324) (0.531) (0.327) (0.023) (0.097) (0.235) (0.095)
Capital Expenditure −0.015 −0.075 0.280 −0.131 −0.016∗ 0.006 0.394∗∗∗ −0.050
(0.009) (0.119) (0.208) (0.116) (0.009) (0.057) (0.123) (0.053)
Ln(1+Sales Growth) −0.000 0.045∗∗ 0.082∗∗ 0.049∗∗ −0.001 0.048∗∗∗ 0.085∗∗∗ 0.052∗∗∗
(0.002) (0.021) (0.033) (0.022) (0.002) (0.014) (0.025) (0.015)
Leverage −0.002 0.076 −0.043 0.113 −0.002 0.089∗∗ −0.024 0.126∗∗∗
(0.009) (0.075) (0.123) (0.076) (0.009) (0.042) (0.085) (0.041)
Ln(Total Assets) 0.001 −0.060∗∗∗ 0.058 −0.082∗∗∗ 0.002 −0.063∗∗∗ 0.054∗∗ −0.085∗∗∗
(0.003) (0.022) (0.036) (0.023) (0.003) (0.013) (0.025) (0.013)
Ln(1+Firm Age) 0.013 −0.252∗∗∗ −0.473∗∗∗ −0.177∗ 0.022∗∗ −0.310∗∗∗ −0.556∗∗∗ −0.236∗∗∗
(0.009) (0.096) (0.155) (0.096) (0.009) (0.039) (0.074) (0.038)
Diversification −0.003 −0.012 −0.035 −0.011 −0.002 0.002 −0.014 0.003
(0.002) (0.019) (0.033) (0.018) (0.002) (0.005) (0.013) (0.004)
Return on Assets −0.011 −0.602∗∗∗ −0.714∗∗∗ −0.620∗∗∗ −0.013 −0.546∗∗∗ −0.635∗∗∗ −0.564∗∗∗
(0.009) (0.096) (0.161) (0.097) (0.009) (0.047) (0.097) (0.048)
Surplus Cash −0.004 −0.203∗∗∗ −0.587∗∗∗ −0.161∗∗ −0.004 −0.180∗∗∗ −0.555∗∗∗ −0.138∗∗∗
(0.010) (0.075) (0.127) (0.076) (0.010) (0.040) (0.092) (0.040)
Director Connectedness 0.000 0.005 0.006 0.006
(0.000) (0.004) (0.006) (0.004)
Male Director Connectedness −0.004∗∗∗ −0.001 −0.003 −0.001
(0.000) (0.002) (0.003) (0.002)
Proportion of Male Directors with Board 0.011 0.062∗∗∗
Connections to Women (0.008) (0.008)
Observations 13,581 13,581 13,581 13,581 13,581 13,581 13,581 13,581
Kleibergen-Paap 1.986 47.933
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Table 7: Alternative Instrumental Variable
This table reports two-stage least squares regressions with firm-level fixed effects of firm equity risk measures on the proportion of women on board and
control variables. In Panel A, the proportion of women and is instrumented using the proportion of male directors with board connections to female
directors. In Panel B, the proportion of women is instrumented using the proportion of male directors with board connections and the proportion of
men’s other directorships with at least one female director. Other control variables are defined in Table A1. All dependent and independent variables
are time-demeaned in both first-stage and second-stage regressions. All models include year dummy variables. Within-cluster heteroskedasticity
and serial correlation robust standard errors are reported in parentheses. Intercepts are included but not reported. ∗ , ∗∗ , ∗∗∗ denote statistical
significance at 10%, 5% and 1% respectively.
(A) Exactly Identified Model (B) Overidentified Model
Proportion Total Systematic Idiosyncratic Proportion Total Systematic Idiosyncratic
of Women Risk Risk Risk of Women Risk Risk Risk
Proportion of Women 0.864∗ 1.467 0.814∗ −0.116 −0.235 −0.147
(0.468) (0.996) (0.461) (0.224) (0.434) (0.224)
Board Size 0.002∗∗ −0.009∗∗∗ −0.020∗∗∗ −0.009∗∗∗ 0.004∗∗∗ −0.007∗∗∗ −0.017∗∗∗ −0.008∗∗∗
(0.001) (0.003) (0.006) (0.003) (0.001) (0.003) (0.005) (0.003)
Board Independence 0.074∗∗∗ −0.075 −0.102 −0.078∗ 0.067∗∗∗ −0.004 0.022 −0.008
(0.008) (0.047) (0.099) (0.046) (0.008) (0.035) (0.070) (0.034)
Male Director Connectedness −0.002∗∗∗ 0.003∗ 0.005 0.004∗∗ −0.005∗∗∗ 0.001 0.001 0.001
(0.000) (0.002) (0.003) (0.002) (0.000) (0.002) (0.003) (0.002)
CEO Vega 0.004 −0.162∗∗∗ −0.306∗∗∗ −0.149∗∗∗ −0.001 −0.158∗∗∗ −0.299∗∗∗ −0.145∗∗∗
(0.006) (0.025) (0.043) (0.024) (0.006) (0.024) (0.041) (0.023)
CEO Delta 0.000 0.008∗∗ 0.005 0.008∗∗ 0.000 0.008∗∗ 0.005 0.009∗∗
(0.001) (0.003) (0.006) (0.003) (0.001) (0.003) (0.006) (0.003)
CEO Tenure −0.000 0.002∗∗ 0.003∗∗∗ 0.001∗ −0.000 0.001∗∗ 0.003∗∗ 0.001
(0.000) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.000) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
CEO Cash Compensation 0.000 −0.014∗∗∗ −0.023∗∗∗ −0.012∗∗∗ 0.000 −0.014∗∗∗ −0.022∗∗∗ −0.012∗∗∗
(0.001) (0.004) (0.008) (0.004) (0.001) (0.004) (0.008) (0.004)
Market-to-Book 0.001 0.018∗∗∗ 0.107∗∗∗ 0.005 0.001 0.018∗∗∗ 0.109∗∗∗ 0.006
(0.001) (0.004) (0.009) (0.004) (0.001) (0.004) (0.009) (0.004)
R&D Expenditure −0.044∗ −0.230∗∗ 0.454∗ −0.321∗∗∗ −0.050∗∗ −0.277∗∗∗ 0.373 −0.367∗∗∗
(0.023) (0.099) (0.245) (0.093) (0.022) (0.094) (0.234) (0.089)
Capital Expenditure −0.016∗ 0.039 0.451∗∗∗ −0.018 −0.014 0.022 0.422∗∗∗ −0.034
(0.009) (0.056) (0.117) (0.052) (0.009) (0.055) (0.118) (0.051)
Ln(1+Sales Growth) −0.001 0.050∗∗∗ 0.090∗∗∗ 0.054∗∗∗ −0.001 0.049∗∗∗ 0.088∗∗∗ 0.053∗∗∗
(0.002) (0.014) (0.025) (0.014) (0.002) (0.014) (0.025) (0.014)
Leverage −0.004 0.095∗∗ −0.015 0.131∗∗∗ −0.005 0.092∗∗ −0.019 0.129∗∗∗
(0.009) (0.041) (0.085) (0.040) (0.008) (0.041) (0.084) (0.040)
Ln(1+Total Assets) 0.003 −0.067∗∗∗ 0.047∗ −0.089∗∗∗ 0.003 −0.065∗∗∗ 0.051∗∗ −0.087∗∗∗
(0.003) (0.013) (0.025) (0.013) (0.003) (0.013) (0.024) (0.013)
Ln(1+Firm Age) 0.022∗∗ −0.352∗∗∗ −0.628∗∗∗ −0.276∗∗∗ 0.023∗∗∗ −0.331∗∗∗ −0.591∗∗∗ −0.255∗∗∗
(0.009) (0.039) (0.077) (0.036) (0.009) (0.037) (0.072) (0.035)
Diversification −0.003∗ 0.008∗ −0.004 0.009∗∗ −0.002 0.005 −0.010 0.006
(0.002) (0.004) (0.010) (0.004) (0.002) (0.004) (0.011) (0.004)
Return on Assets −0.014 −0.520∗∗∗ −0.590∗∗∗ −0.538∗∗∗ −0.015 −0.533∗∗∗ −0.613∗∗∗ −0.551∗∗∗
(0.009) (0.045) (0.094) (0.047) (0.009) (0.045) (0.094) (0.046)
Surplus Cash −0.006 −0.169∗∗∗ −0.535∗∗∗ −0.127∗∗∗ −0.003 −0.175∗∗∗ −0.545∗∗∗ −0.133∗∗∗
(0.009) (0.042) (0.097) (0.043) (0.009) (0.040) (0.093) (0.040)
Proportion Of Male External Board −0.023∗∗∗ −0.048∗∗∗
Seats with Women (0.003) (0.003)
Proportion of Men’s Other Board Seats 0.126∗∗∗
with Women on Board (0.009)
Observations 13,360 13,360 13,360 13,360 13,360 13,360 13,360 13,360
Kleibergen-Paap 62.782 130.544
Hansen (χ2 = 1) 5.698∗∗ 3.928∗∗ 5.657∗∗
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Table 8: Effect of Female Director Appointments on Risk Measures
This table report results from difference-in-difference estimations. Dependent variables are firm equity risk
measures. Treatment observations are firms that replace a departing male director with a female directors.
Control observations are firms that replace a departing male director with another male directors. In Panel
A, treatment firms are matched with control firms of similar propensity (within 5%) of appointing a women
director. Propensity scores are calculated from Model 1 in Table 3. In Panel B, treatment firms are matched
with control firms using the nearest-neighbor matching methods (Abadie et al., 2004). Matching variables
are independent variables in Model 1 of Table 3. Additionally, treatment firms and matched control firms
must be in the same year and industry. Female Appointment is a dummy variable which equals one if the
firm appoints a female director and zero otherwise. Post Period is a dummy variable which equals one in
the period after the appointment and zero in the period before. Control variables are defined in Table A1.
Within-cluster heteroskedasticity and serial correlation robust standard errors are reported in parentheses.
Intercepts are included but not reported. *, **, *** denote statistical significance at 10%, 5% and 1%
respectively.
Panel A: Propensity Score Matching Panel B: Nearest Neighbor Matching
Dependent Variable = Total Systematic Idiosyncratic Total Systematic Idiosyncratic
Risk Risk Risk Risk Risk Risk
Female Appointment −0.007 0.020 −0.002 −0.005 0.01 −0.005
× Post Period (0.038) (0.066) (0.039) (0.021) (0.042) (0.022)
Female Appointment −0.054∗ −0.093∗ −0.056∗ −0.032 −0.056 −0.031
(0.028) (0.050) (0.029) (0.024) (0.045) (0.024)
Post Period −0.003 −0.003 −0.007 −0.003 0.004 −0.003
(0.015) (0.029) (0.016) (0.013) (0.024) (0.013)
Board Size −0.032∗∗∗ −0.072∗∗∗ −0.029∗∗∗ −0.024∗∗∗ −0.046∗∗∗ −0.020∗∗
(0.004) (0.007) (0.004) (0.008) (0.014) (0.009)
Board Independence −0.064 −0.119 −0.103∗ −0.059 −0.067 −0.064
(0.052) (0.102) (0.053) (0.084) (0.153) (0.082)
Director Connectedness 0.034∗∗ 0.053∗ 0.039∗∗ 0.022 0.112∗∗ 0.006
(0.017) (0.032) (0.017) (0.030) (0.053) (0.029)
CEO Vega −0.000∗∗∗ −0.000∗∗∗ −0.000∗∗∗ −0.180∗∗∗ −0.469∗∗∗ −0.134∗∗
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.067) (0.108) (0.063)
CEO Delta 0.000∗ 0.000 0.000 0.009 0.02 0.007
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.009) (0.016) (0.008)
CEO Tenure 0.002∗∗∗ 0.002 0.002∗∗ 0.001 0.001 0.001
(0.001) (0.002) (0.001) (0.002) (0.003) (0.002)
CEO Cash Compensation −0.000 0.000 −0.000 0.005 −0.019 0.01
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.011) (0.019) (0.011)
Market-to-Book 0.044∗∗∗ 0.117∗∗∗ 0.039∗∗∗ 0.015 0.064∗∗ 0.012
(0.007) (0.016) (0.007) (0.017) (0.032) (0.017)
R&D Expenditure 0.118∗ 0.259∗∗ 0.116∗ 0.690∗∗∗ 1.336∗∗∗ 0.730∗∗∗
(0.065) (0.111) (0.063) (0.221) (0.481) (0.219)
Capital Expenditure 0.102 0.298∗ 0.036 0.098 0.277 0.076
(0.080) (0.169) (0.081) (0.140) (0.316) (0.132)
Ln(Sales Growth) −0.565∗∗∗ −1.188∗∗∗ −0.446∗∗∗ 0.052 0.094 0.056
(0.111) (0.217) (0.109) (0.047) (0.103) (0.045)
Leverage −0.045 −0.285∗∗∗ −0.004 −0.116 −0.302∗ −0.086
(0.051) (0.097) (0.052) (0.093) (0.168) (0.094)
Ln(Total Assets) −0.013 0.070∗∗∗ −0.030∗∗∗ −0.045∗∗∗ 0.023 −0.058∗∗∗
(0.009) (0.017) (0.008) (0.017) (0.029) (0.016)
Ln(1+Firm Age) −0.078∗∗∗ −0.087∗∗∗ −0.091∗∗∗ −0.065∗∗∗ −0.093∗∗ −0.067∗∗∗
(0.013) (0.025) (0.013) (0.025) (0.040) (0.025)
Diversification 0.004 −0.063 0.011 0.056 0.064 0.074
(0.035) (0.072) (0.034) (0.051) (0.091) (0.051)
Return on Assets −0.775∗∗∗ −1.251∗∗∗ −0.756∗∗∗ −1.206∗∗∗ −1.297∗∗∗ −1.233∗∗∗
(0.130) (0.212) (0.125) (0.158) (0.332) (0.165)
Surplus Cash 0.038 −0.012 0.076∗∗∗ −0.506∗∗ −1.216∗∗∗ −0.406∗∗
(0.028) (0.052) (0.028) (0.196) (0.346) (0.205)
Observations 1,781 1,781 1,781 2,448 2,448 2,448
R2 0.565 0.373 0.557 0.65 0.435 0.651
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Table 9: Other Measures of Firm Risk
This table reports fixed effects estimation of CEO Vega, research and development Expenditure, Herfindahl-
Hirschman index of firm diversification and the standard deviation of firm’s return on assets on proportion of
women on board and control variables. Stock Returns is average daily returns multiplied by 250. Dividends
is a dummy which equals one if the firm pays dividends. Net PP&E is the net value of firm’s property, plant
and equipment scaled by total assets. Other control variables are defined in Table A1. All models include
year dummy variables. Within-cluster heteroskedasticity and serial correlation robust standard errors are
reported in parentheses. Intercepts are included but not reported. *, **, *** denote statistical significance
at 10%, 5% and 1% respectively.
Dependent Variable = CEO Vega R&D Diversification Leverage S.D.(ROA)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Proportion of Women 0.032 −0.004 −0.085∗ −0.006 0.006
(0.045) (0.004) (0.044) (0.028) (0.025)
Board Size −0.003∗ −0.000 −0.003∗ −0.001 0.001
(0.002) (0.000) (0.002) (0.001) (0.001)
Board Independence 0.020 0.001 −0.039 −0.010 0.022∗∗∗
(0.021) (0.002) (0.026) (0.015) (0.007)
Director Connectedness −0.007 0.001 −0.008 −0.004 −0.006∗
(0.012) (0.001) (0.010) (0.006) (0.004)
CEO Vega 0.004∗∗ 0.025 −0.033∗∗∗ −0.002
(0.002) (0.017) (0.010) (0.006)
CEO Delta 0.022∗∗∗ −0.000 −0.001 −0.001 0.002
(0.005) (0.000) (0.002) (0.001) (0.002)
CEO Tenure −0.000 −0.001∗ 0.000 −0.000
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
CEO Cash Compensation 0.029∗∗∗ −0.001∗∗∗ 0.011∗∗∗ −0.007∗∗∗ −0.000
(0.006) (0.000) (0.003) (0.002) (0.001)
Ln(Total Assets) 0.062∗∗∗ −0.001 −0.048∗∗∗ 0.036∗∗∗ 0.017∗∗
(0.008) (0.001) (0.009) (0.007) (0.007)
Market-to-Book −0.010∗∗ −0.001∗∗∗ 0.007∗∗ −0.011∗∗∗ 0.004
(0.004) (0.000) (0.003) (0.002) (0.002)
Return on Assets 0.058∗∗∗ 0.086∗∗∗ −0.240∗∗∗ 0.022
(0.021) (0.026) (0.021) (0.025)
R&D Expenditure 0.345∗∗ 0.008 0.150
(0.147) (0.112) (0.149)
Capital Expenditure 0.043∗ 0.061∗
(0.024) (0.033)
Leverage −0.066∗∗∗ 0.008∗∗ −0.004 −0.044∗∗
(0.022) (0.003) (0.024) (0.021)
Diversification 0.007
(0.009)
Ln(1+Sales Growth) −0.005∗∗∗ 0.013∗ 0.014∗∗
(0.001) (0.008) (0.006)










Observations 13,581 13,581 13,581 13,581 8,379
R2 0.199 0.037 0.143 0.108 0.044
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Table 10: Women on Boards and Bank Risk
The sample comprises 794 observations from 130 bank holding companies (BHCs) with data available on RiskMetrics, Compustat, Execucomp and
CRSP. Ln(1+Asset Growth) is the logarithm of current year’s total assets divided by previous year’s total assets. Deposit ratio is total deposit
divided by total assets. Capital adequacy ratio is the sum of tier-1 and tier-2 capital ratio. Charter value is the market value divided by the book
value of firm’s total assets. Loan ratio is total loan divided by total assets. Non-performing loan ratio is non-performing loan scaled by total loan.
All models include year dummy variables. Bank-level cluster-robust standard errors are reported fro ordinary least squares and fixed effects models.
Finite-sample robust standard errors (Windmeijer, 2005) are reported for dynamic panel system GMM. Intercepts are included but not reported. ∗ ,∗∗ , ∗∗∗ denote statistical significance at 10%, 5% and 1% respectively.
Ordinary Least Squares Fixed Effects Dynamic Panel System GMM
Dependent Variable = Total Systematic Idiosyncratic Total Systematic Idiosyncratic Total Systematic Idiosyncratic
Risk Risk Risk Risk Risk Risk Risk Risk Risk
Proportion of Women 0.258 0.266 0.287 0.258 0.109 0.272 0.721 0.218 0.052
(0.181) (0.222) (0.208) (0.222) (0.282) (0.257) (1.237) (1.731) (1.229)
Board Size −0.008∗ −0.011∗ −0.008∗ −0.002 −0.012∗ −0.001 −0.004 0.006 0.004
(0.003) (0.004) (0.003) (0.004) (0.006) (0.004) (0.014) (0.030) (0.015)
Board Independence −0.038 −0.002 −0.046 −0.082 −0.194 −0.065 −0.352 −0.455 −0.660∗
(0.095) (0.122) (0.104) (0.113) (0.156) (0.117) (0.387) (0.623) (0.394)
Director Connectedness 0.004∗ 0.005∗ 0.004∗ 0.003 0.006 0.003 0.005 0.016 0.003
(0.002) (0.003) (0.002) (0.003) (0.004) (0.003) (0.011) (0.016) (0.012)
CEO Vega −0.184∗ −0.317∗ −0.187∗ −0.198∗ −0.338∗ −0.194∗ −0.042 −0.426 −0.046
(0.091) (0.143) (0.086) (0.086) (0.137) (0.080) (0.258) (0.477) (0.282)
CEO Delta 0.012∗∗∗ 0.018∗∗∗ 0.013∗∗∗ −0.002 −0.004 −0.001 0.000 0.010 0.000
(0.003) (0.005) (0.003) (0.004) (0.008) (0.004) (0.012) (0.021) (0.012)
CEO Tenure 0.001 0.002 0.000 −0.003 −0.004 −0.003 0.007 0.004 0.012
(0.002) (0.003) (0.002) (0.002) (0.003) (0.002) (0.008) (0.013) (0.008)
CEO Cash Compensation 0.010 0.024∗ 0.006 −0.007 −0.008 −0.008 0.012 −0.004 0.003
(0.008) (0.011) (0.009) (0.006) (0.009) (0.007) (0.035) (0.057) (0.036)
Ln(Total Assets) −0.025 0.016 −0.028∗ −0.004 0.078 0.003 −0.012 0.057 0.021
(0.016) (0.022) (0.017) (0.048) (0.073) (0.051) (0.058) (0.113) (0.070)
Ln(1+Asset Growth) −0.124∗ −0.220∗∗∗ −0.120∗ −0.216∗∗∗ −0.287∗∗∗ −0.245∗∗∗ −1.112∗∗∗ −0.840∗ −1.340∗∗∗
(0.063) (0.084) (0.071) (0.065) (0.104) (0.068) (0.403) (0.455) (0.456)
Deposit Ratio 0.016 0.092 0.008 0.643∗ 0.676∗ 0.809∗∗∗ −0.131 1.712 −0.206
(0.170) (0.227) (0.180) (0.279) (0.384) (0.283) (0.682) (1.424) (0.835)
Capital Adequacy Ratio −0.363 −0.352 −0.366 0.999∗ 2.504∗∗∗ 0.755 −2.593 −1.914 −2.372
(0.569) (0.716) (0.609) (0.490) (0.803) (0.561) (2.272) (4.611) (2.260)
Charter Value −0.225∗ −0.176 −0.267∗ −0.145 −0.117 −0.169 0.693 1.872∗ 0.762
(0.127) (0.203) (0.146) (0.115) (0.262) (0.127) (0.625) (1.117) (0.469)
Loan Ratio −0.324∗∗∗ −0.421∗∗∗ −0.268∗ −0.174 0.069 −0.185 0.271 −0.384 0.409
(0.118) (0.152) (0.129) (0.183) (0.273) (0.184) (0.557) (0.791) (0.519)
Non-performing Loan Ratio 2.601∗ 2.404 3.110∗ 2.223 2.457 2.515 2.287 6.171 4.070
(1.375) (1.532) (1.544) (1.455) (1.508) (1.682) (5.329) (9.657) (5.228)
Risk Measure (Lag 1) 0.407 0.003 0.283
(0.260) (0.136) (0.220)
Risk Measure (Lag 2) −0.128 0.111 0.041
(0.270) (0.177) (0.270)
Observations 881 881 881 881 881 881 632 632 632
R2 0.819 0.537 0.770 0.881 0.610 0.853
Hansen (df=29) 25.947 26.392 25.964
AR(1) −2.294∗∗ −2.152∗∗ −2.495∗∗
AR(2) 0.026 −1.436 −0.139
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Table A1: Definition of Variables
Variable Definition
Board Characteristics (Source: RiskMetrics)
Proportion of Women Number of female directors divided by number of directors.
Board Size Number of directors on board.
Board Independence. Number of independent directors (as defined by RiskMetrics) divided
by number of directors.
Director Connectedness Total number of external board seats held by all directors.
Male Director Connectedness Total number of external board seats held by all male directors.
Proportion of Male Directors
with Board Connections to
Women
Number of male directors with board connections to women divided by
number of male directors on board. Male directors are defined as having
board connections to women when they sit on at least one other board
on which there are female directors.
Proportion off Male External
Board Seats with Women
Number of outside directorships of male directors that have at least one
female directors divided by total number of outside directorships.
CEO Risk-Taking Incentives (Source: Execucomp)
CEO Vega Dollar change in CEO compensation per 0.01 unit increase in a firm’s
standard deivation of stock returns ($million).
CEO Delta Dollar change in CEO compensation per 1% increase in stock returns
($million).
CEO Tenure The duration (years) the current CEO remains in his/her position.
CEO Cash Compensation Dollar amount of CEO cash compensation ($million).
Firm Characteristics (Source: Compustat)
Market-to-Book Market value of total assets divided by the book value of total assets.
Market value of total assets is defined as the book value of total assets
less the book value of total equity plus share price times the number of
shares outstanding.
R&D Expenditure Research and development expenditure divided by the book value of
total assets or zero if the data is missing.
Capital Expenditure Capital expenditure less sale of property divided by total assets.
Leverage Total liabilities divided by the book value of equity
Ln(Total Assets) Logarithm of the book value of firm total assets
Return on Assets Earnings before tax divided by the book value of total assets.
Ln(1+Sales Growth) Logarithm of current year’s sales minus the logarithm of previous year’s
sales.
Surplus Cash Net cash flow from operating activities less depreciation and amortiza-
tion plus research and development expenditure divided by the book
value of total assets.
Risk Measures (Source: CRSP)
Total Risk Logarithm of square root of 250 times daily return standard deviation.
Systematic Risk Coefficient of the stock market portfolio return from a market-model re-
gression. CRSP NYSE/AMEX/NASDAQ/Arca equally-weighted index
is the market portfolio proxy.
Idiosyncratic Risk Logarithm of the square root of 250 times the residuals from the market
model regression.
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Table A2: Dynamic Panel System GMM Robustness Checks
This table reports two-step Dynamic Panel System GMM estimations of risk measures on the proportion of
women on board and other control variables. The specifications are identical to the models presented in Table
4 except Panels A, B and C include one, three and four lags of the dependent variable as control variables
instead of two lags. Panel D shows two-lag estimations based on a subsample of data from 1996, 1998, ... 2008
and 2010. Panel E uses male director connectedness as a control variable instead of director connectedness.
All independent variables are treated as endogenous except Ln(1+Firm Age) and year dummy variables.
Endogenous variables are instrumented by two of their past values. In parentheses are finite-sample robust
standard errors (Windmeijer, 2005). The null hypothesis for the Hansen Overidentification test is that all
instruments are exogenous. AR(1) and AR(2) are test statistics for the null hypothesis that there is no serial
correlation of order 1 and 2 in the first-difference residuals. ∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01.
(A) One Lag of Risk Measures (B) Three Lags of Risk Measures
Risk Measure = Total Systematic Idiosyncratic Total Systematic Idiosyncratic
Risk Risk Risk Risk Risk Risk
Proportion of Women −0.064 −0.164 −0.145 0.123 −0.323 0.097
(0.119) (0.242) (0.127) (0.361) (0.554) (0.392)
Board Size −0.002 0.008 −0.007 0.005 0.007 −0.000
(0.008) (0.016) (0.008) (0.018) (0.034) (0.020)
Board Independence 0.096 0.311 −0.021 −0.256 0.031 −0.606∗∗∗
(0.092) (0.192) (0.094) (0.215) (0.372) (0.222)
Director Connectedness −0.001 −0.010∗ 0.002 −0.009 −0.013 −0.004
(0.003) (0.006) (0.003) (0.007) (0.012) (0.008)
CEO Vega −0.163∗∗∗ −0.331∗∗∗ −0.155∗∗∗ −0.259∗ −0.196 −0.357∗∗
(0.051) (0.098) (0.052) (0.147) (0.243) (0.167)
CEO Delta 0.012 0.031 0.012 0.057∗ 0.036 0.057
(0.009) (0.021) (0.009) (0.034) (0.050) (0.035)
CEO Tenure 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 −0.007 0.005
(0.001) (0.003) (0.001) (0.004) (0.007) (0.004)
CEO Cash Compensation 0.003 0.029 0.017 0.042 0.076 0.051
(0.015) (0.037) (0.014) (0.031) (0.057) (0.035)
Market-to-Book 0.086∗∗∗ 0.117∗∗∗ 0.078∗∗∗ 0.043 0.192∗ 0.034
(0.016) (0.034) (0.017) (0.046) (0.104) (0.044)
R&D Expenditure −0.829∗∗ −0.684 −0.911∗∗ 0.980∗ 0.295 1.164∗
(0.405) (0.802) (0.441) (0.574) (1.101) (0.603)
Capital Expenditure 0.123 1.000∗∗ −0.040 −0.234 −0.197 −0.783
(0.191) (0.413) (0.209) (0.432) (0.663) (0.527)
Leverage 0.168∗∗ −0.022 0.194∗∗ −0.427∗ −0.892∗∗ −0.425
(0.079) (0.153) (0.081) (0.229) (0.365) (0.261)
Ln(Total Assets) −0.039∗∗ −0.014 −0.040∗∗ −0.052 −0.058 −0.033
(0.016) (0.033) (0.018) (0.036) (0.054) (0.043)
Return on Assets −1.624∗∗∗ −2.459∗∗∗ −1.303∗∗∗ −0.261 1.000 −0.307
(0.314) (0.840) (0.325) (0.506) (1.059) (0.523)
Ln(1+Sales Growth) 0.040 −0.078 0.014 0.018 0.167 −0.016
(0.043) (0.086) (0.047) (0.116) (0.230) (0.125)
Surplus Cash 0.332 1.187 −0.157 −1.460∗∗ −3.669∗∗ −1.884∗∗∗
(0.343) (0.972) (0.332) (0.600) (1.622) (0.578)
Diversification −0.031 −0.015 −0.047 −0.124 −0.370∗ −0.147
(0.024) (0.063) (0.030) (0.144) (0.217) (0.116)
Ln(1+Firm Age) −0.006 0.056 −0.044∗∗ 0.066∗ −0.009 0.017
(0.018) (0.038) (0.020) (0.037) (0.062) (0.039)
Risk Measure (Lag 1) 0.557∗∗∗ 0.655∗∗∗ 0.541∗∗∗ 0.294∗ 0.237 0.103
(0.041) (0.051) (0.046) (0.164) (0.162) (0.138)
Risk Measure (Lag 2) −0.101 0.204 −0.032
(0.164) (0.129) (0.157)
Risk Measure (Lag 3) 0.414∗∗∗ 0.059 0.453∗∗∗
(0.143) (0.111) (0.156)
Observations 10,859 10,859 10,859 6,802 6,802 6,802
Hansen 71.059∗∗∗ 76.001∗∗∗ 61.855∗∗∗ 46.860 36.113 46.882
AR(1) −13.517∗∗∗ −12.920∗∗∗ −13.564∗∗∗ −3.945∗∗∗ −3.535∗∗∗ −4.110∗∗∗
AR(2) 2.193∗∗ 4.067∗∗∗ 2.723∗∗∗ 1.458 −0.642 0.843
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(Table A2 continued)
(C) Four Lags of Risk Measures (D) Sample from 1996,1998,..., 2010
Risk Measure = Total Systematic Idiosyncratic Total Systematic Idiosyncratic
Risk Risk Risk Risk Risk Risk
Proportion of Women −0.031 −0.150 −0.020 0.048 −0.871 0.040
(0.367) (0.500) (0.401) (0.405) (0.804) (0.422)
Board Size 0.016 0.020 0.010 −0.018 −0.009 −0.031
(0.019) (0.032) (0.021) (0.020) (0.045) (0.021)
Board Independence −0.308 0.136 −0.557∗∗ −0.555∗∗ −0.163 −0.780∗∗∗
(0.217) (0.349) (0.233) (0.250) (0.509) (0.256)
Director Connectedness −0.008 −0.012 −0.003 0.003 −0.030∗ 0.008
(0.007) (0.012) (0.008) (0.007) (0.016) (0.008)
CEO Vega −0.156 −0.224 −0.243 −0.276∗ −0.707∗∗ −0.268
(0.150) (0.219) (0.170) (0.149) (0.321) (0.164)
CEO Delta 0.054 0.037 0.060 0.035 0.049 0.030
(0.035) (0.045) (0.038) (0.039) (0.069) (0.036)
CEO Tenure 0.001 −0.002 0.006 −0.005 −0.010 −0.006
(0.004) (0.006) (0.004) (0.004) (0.009) (0.004)
CEO Cash Compensation 0.048 0.047 0.058∗ 0.017 0.082 0.026
(0.029) (0.050) (0.035) (0.037) (0.077) (0.038)
Market-to-Book 0.046 0.107 0.025 0.124∗∗∗ 0.324∗∗∗ 0.079∗
(0.041) (0.087) (0.042) (0.044) (0.087) (0.045)
R&D Expenditure 0.775 0.169 0.913∗ 1.921∗∗ 4.687∗∗∗ 1.948∗∗
(0.501) (0.969) (0.530) (0.754) (1.732) (0.795)
Capital Expenditure −0.405 −0.135 −0.903 −0.279 0.431 −0.467
(0.464) (0.656) (0.571) (0.475) (1.047) (0.509)
Leverage −0.480∗∗ −0.806∗∗ −0.418 −0.183 0.245 −0.081
(0.235) (0.335) (0.264) (0.281) (0.576) (0.297)
Ln(Total Assets) −0.076∗∗ −0.057 −0.064 −0.061 0.017 −0.047
(0.035) (0.049) (0.041) (0.042) (0.084) (0.042)
Return on Assets −0.419 0.428 −0.580 0.148 0.800 −0.018
(0.582) (0.772) (0.619) (0.539) (1.101) (0.546)
Ln(1+Sales Growth) 0.056 0.232 0.036 0.305∗∗ 0.713∗∗ 0.299∗
(0.106) (0.230) (0.117) (0.139) (0.290) (0.158)
Surplus Cash −1.564∗∗∗ −1.731 −1.845∗∗∗ −1.702∗∗∗ −3.694∗∗∗ −1.598∗∗∗
(0.559) (1.074) (0.530) (0.530) (1.042) (0.533)
Diversification −0.112 −0.325∗ −0.108 −0.111 −0.355 −0.063
(0.136) (0.178) (0.118) (0.129) (0.286) (0.148)
Ln(1+Firm Age) 0.050 0.051 0.004 0.075 0.131 0.031
(0.044) (0.062) (0.046) (0.047) (0.099) (0.048)
Risk Measure (Lag 1) 0.280∗ 0.404∗∗∗ 0.057 0.324∗∗∗ 0.334∗∗∗ 0.316∗∗
(0.151) (0.143) (0.134) (0.104) (0.084) (0.128)
Risk Measure (Lag 2) −0.064 0.066 0.090 0.044 −0.112 0.019
(0.166) (0.137) (0.160) (0.109) (0.113) (0.121)
Risk Measure (Lag 3) 0.435∗∗∗ −0.013 0.461∗∗∗
(0.133) (0.105) (0.149)
Risk Measure (Lag 4) −0.106 0.144∗ −0.135
(0.121) (0.082) (0.128)
Observations 5,296 5,296 5,296 3,087 3,087 3,087
Hansen 46.554 39.420 46.580 47.623 48.087 39.203
AR(1) −3.955∗∗∗ −3.309∗∗∗ −3.525∗∗∗ −4.480∗∗∗ −4.462∗∗∗ −4.070∗∗∗
AR(2) 1.421 −0.092 0.017 −0.996 0.448 −0.605
(Continued on next page...)
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(Table A2 continued)
(E) Sample from 1997, 1999, ..., 2009 (F) Male Director Connectedness
Risk Measure = Total Systematic Idiosyncratic Total Systematic Idiosyncratic
Risk Risk Risk Risk Risk Risk
Proportion of Women 0.400 0.830 0.306 0.054 −0.865 0.115
(0.605) (1.170) (0.621) (0.161) (0.586) (0.172)
Board Size 0.021 −0.111 0.028 0.017 0.022 0.013
(0.034) (0.072) (0.031) (0.011) (0.034) (0.012)
Board Independence −0.104 −0.989 0.037 0.152 0.498 0.041
(0.409) (0.753) (0.367) (0.130) (0.409) (0.144)
Director Connectedness 0.018 0.045∗∗ 0.020 −0.004 −0.016 −0.004
(0.012) (0.022) (0.013) (0.004) (0.014) (0.004)
CEO Vega −0.050 −0.072 −0.123 −0.061 −0.063 −0.090
(0.212) (0.420) (0.206) (0.069) (0.253) (0.070)
CEO Delta −0.017 0.018 −0.012 0.017 0.021 0.009
(0.033) (0.073) (0.029) (0.015) (0.046) (0.016)
CEO Tenure −0.002 −0.000 0.002 0.002 −0.008 0.003
(0.009) (0.016) (0.009) (0.002) (0.006) (0.002)
CEO Cash Compensation −0.102∗∗∗ −0.156∗∗ −0.085∗∗ −0.038∗ 0.076 −0.007
(0.035) (0.066) (0.036) (0.022) (0.067) (0.022)
Market-to-Book 0.050 −0.123 0.049 0.034 0.141 0.032
(0.065) (0.133) (0.058) (0.029) (0.095) (0.030)
R&D Expenditure −0.410 0.819 −0.364 0.231 −0.601 0.282
(0.625) (1.507) (0.649) (0.419) (0.938) (0.430)
Capital Expenditure 0.876 0.691 0.784 −0.248 −0.141 −0.267
(0.607) (1.058) (0.627) (0.264) (0.696) (0.301)
Leverage 0.740∗∗ 0.455 0.822∗∗ −0.239∗∗ −0.794∗∗ −0.210∗∗
(0.335) (0.565) (0.347) (0.098) (0.342) (0.102)
Ln(Total Assets) −0.052 0.039 −0.078∗ −0.041∗ −0.057 −0.047∗∗
(0.045) (0.085) (0.046) (0.021) (0.051) (0.022)
Return on Assets −2.070∗∗∗ −4.164∗∗ −1.419∗ −1.431∗∗∗ −0.344 −1.684∗∗∗
(0.733) (1.725) (0.789) (0.406) (0.782) (0.436)
Ln(1+Sales Growth) 0.401∗ 0.160 0.234 0.152∗ 0.178 0.084
(0.227) (0.353) (0.237) (0.081) (0.196) (0.085)
Surplus Cash 0.359 2.736∗∗ 0.424 −0.412 −2.371∗∗ −0.224
(0.650) (1.306) (0.681) (0.484) (1.195) (0.452)
Diversification 0.058 −0.062 0.062 0.193 −0.222 0.180
(0.153) (0.274) (0.159) (0.118) (0.202) (0.110)
Ln(1+Firm Age) 0.003 0.166∗∗ −0.038 0.050∗∗ −0.032 0.027
(0.044) (0.083) (0.046) (0.021) (0.057) (0.024)
Risk Measure (Lag 1) 0.591∗∗∗ 0.459∗∗∗ 0.550∗∗∗ 0.465∗∗∗ 0.280 0.523∗∗∗
(0.138) (0.108) (0.145) (0.113) (0.182) (0.130)
Risk Measure (Lag 2) 0.067 0.185 0.032 0.157∗ 0.264∗ 0.041
(0.161) (0.122) (0.180) (0.091) (0.139) (0.099)
Observations 2,972 2,972 2,972 8,629 8,629 8,629
Hansen Overidentification 30.826 31.570 24.008 43.969 36.846 45.052
AR(1) −3.819∗∗∗ −3.408∗∗∗ −3.664∗∗∗ −4.567∗∗∗ −2.318∗∗∗ −4.557∗∗∗
AR(2) −0.117 −1.420 0.039 −1.004 −1.013 0.174
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Table A3: Results with Female Board Connections of Male Director as Control
This table reports ordinary least square, fixed effects and dynamic panel system GMM regressions of equity risk measures on proportion of women
and other control varialbes. Proportion of male directors with board connections to women is included as an additional control variable. All models
include year dummy variables. Bank-level cluster-robust standard errors are reported fro ordinary least squares and fixed effects models. Finite-sample
robust standard errors (Windmeijer, 2005) are reported for dynamic panel system GMM. Intercepts are included but not reported. ∗ , ∗∗ , ∗∗∗ denote
statistical significance at 10%, 5% and 1% respectively.
Ordinary Least Squares Fixed Effects Dynamic Panel System GMM
Dependent Variable = Total Systematic Idiosyncratic Total Systematic Idiosyncratic Total Systematic Idiosyncratic
Risk Risk Risk Risk Risk Risk Risk Risk Risk
Prop. of Men with Board −0.156∗∗∗ −0.194∗∗∗ −0.171∗∗∗ −0.076∗∗∗ −0.111∗∗ −0.077∗∗∗ 0.016 −0.084 −0.062
Connections to Women (0.030) (0.055) (0.030) (0.028) (0.055) (0.028) (0.118) (0.386) (0.118)
Proportion of Women −0.094∗ −0.315∗∗∗ −0.053 0.036 −0.025 0.059 0.088 −0.407 0.154
(0.052) (0.090) (0.054) (0.065) (0.121) (0.065) (0.154) (0.520) (0.167)
Board Size −0.017∗∗∗ −0.033∗∗∗ −0.016∗∗∗ −0.009∗∗∗ −0.020∗∗∗ −0.010∗∗∗ 0.021∗ −0.037 0.017
(0.003) (0.005) (0.003) (0.003) (0.006) (0.003) (0.012) (0.032) (0.012)
Board Independence 0.023 0.036 0.027 −0.013 0.012 −0.021 0.172 0.154 0.074
(0.030) (0.055) (0.030) (0.031) (0.063) (0.030) (0.132) (0.352) (0.147)
Director Connectedness 0.002∗ 0.003 0.003∗∗∗ 0.004∗∗∗ 0.005∗ 0.005∗∗∗ −1.427∗∗∗ −0.005 −1.697∗∗∗
(0.001) (0.002) (0.001) (0.002) (0.003) (0.002) (0.409) (0.797) (0.440)
CEO Vega −0.095∗∗∗ −0.300∗∗∗ −0.068∗∗∗ −0.157∗∗∗ −0.297∗∗∗ −0.143∗∗∗ 0.213 0.822 0.225
(0.023) (0.044) (0.021) (0.024) (0.041) (0.023) (0.406) (1.307) (0.415)
CEO Delta 0.011∗∗∗ 0.019∗∗∗ 0.010∗∗∗ 0.008∗∗ 0.005 0.009∗∗ −0.241 0.940 −0.278
(0.003) (0.006) (0.003) (0.003) (0.006) (0.003) (0.259) (0.829) (0.301)
CEO Tenure −0.000 0.000 −0.001 0.001∗∗ 0.003∗∗ 0.001 −0.233∗∗ −0.390 −0.189∗
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.099) (0.321) (0.102)
CEO Cash Compensation −0.001 −0.013 0.003 −0.014∗∗∗ −0.023∗∗∗ −0.012∗∗∗ −0.039∗ −0.035 −0.042∗∗
(0.005) (0.008) (0.004) (0.004) (0.008) (0.004) (0.020) (0.057) (0.021)
Market-to-Book 0.007∗ 0.066∗∗∗ 0.001 0.018∗∗∗ 0.108∗∗∗ 0.006 −0.072 −0.101 −0.102
(0.004) (0.009) (0.004) (0.004) (0.009) (0.004) (0.068) (0.210) (0.069)
R&D Expenditure 0.482∗∗∗ 1.237∗∗∗ 0.473∗∗∗ −0.262∗∗∗ 0.394∗ −0.350∗∗∗ 0.003 −0.004 0.004∗
(0.060) (0.143) (0.060) (0.093) (0.232) (0.088) (0.002) (0.007) (0.002)
Capital Expenditure 0.010 0.262∗∗∗ −0.023 0.025 0.425∗∗∗ −0.030 −0.036∗ −0.014 −0.007
(0.045) (0.091) (0.045) (0.055) (0.118) (0.051) (0.021) (0.057) (0.022)
Ln(1+Sales Growth) 0.068∗∗∗ 0.122∗∗∗ 0.077∗∗∗ 0.049∗∗∗ 0.087∗∗∗ 0.053∗∗∗ 0.144∗ 0.306 0.060
(0.015) (0.028) (0.015) (0.014) (0.025) (0.014) (0.082) (0.207) (0.084)
Leverage −0.039 −0.300∗∗∗ 0.002 0.092∗∗ −0.020 0.129∗∗∗ 0.033 0.116∗ 0.036
(0.031) (0.057) (0.031) (0.040) (0.083) (0.039) (0.030) (0.069) (0.032)
Ln(1+Total Assets) −0.044∗∗∗ 0.041∗∗∗ −0.060∗∗∗ −0.065∗∗∗ 0.051∗∗ −0.087∗∗∗ −0.004 0.005 −0.003
(0.005) (0.010) (0.005) (0.013) (0.024) (0.013) (0.004) (0.015) (0.005)
Ln(1+Firm Age) −0.076∗∗∗ −0.073∗∗∗ −0.086∗∗∗ −0.337∗∗∗ −0.597∗∗∗ −0.262∗∗∗ 0.046∗∗ 0.024 0.024
(0.009) (0.016) (0.009) (0.037) (0.071) (0.035) (0.021) (0.055) (0.023)
Diversification 0.011 −0.022 0.022∗ 0.005 −0.010 0.006 0.205∗ −0.503∗∗∗ 0.176
(0.009) (0.014) (0.013) (0.004) (0.011) (0.004) (0.119) (0.189) (0.115)
Return on Assets −0.992∗∗∗ −1.222∗∗∗ −1.005∗∗∗ −0.530∗∗∗ −0.610∗∗∗ −0.547∗∗∗ 0.017 0.060 0.010
(0.048) (0.104) (0.049) (0.045) (0.093) (0.046) (0.015) (0.043) (0.016)
Surplus Cash −0.170∗∗∗ −0.584∗∗∗ −0.105∗∗ −0.177∗∗∗ −0.549∗∗∗ −0.134∗∗∗ −0.310 −2.607∗∗ −0.121
(0.052) (0.130) (0.050) (0.040) (0.093) (0.041) (0.464) (1.139) (0.434)
Risk Measure (Lag 1) 0.501∗∗∗ 0.239 0.569∗∗∗
(0.115) (0.149) (0.129)
Risk Measure (Lag 2) 0.133 0.309∗∗∗ 0.005
(0.089) (0.111) (0.096)
Observations 13,581 13,581 13,581 13,581 13,581 13,581 8,629 8,629 8,629
R2 0.597 0.328 0.599 0.613 0.205 0.596
Hansen (df=40) 45.998 50.810 48.777
AR(1) −4.609∗∗∗ −2.746∗∗∗ −4.827∗∗∗
AR(2) −0.776 −1.504 0.518
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Table A4: Difference-in-Difference Robustness Checks
This table report results from difference-in-difference estimations. Dependent variables are firm equity risk
measures. Treatment observations are firms that replace a departing male director with a female directors.
Control observations are firms that replace a departing male director with another male directors. All control
variables from Table 8 are included but not reported for brevity. In Panel A, treatment firms are matched
with control firms of which the differences in propensity of appointing a women director are with 10%, 2%,
1% and 0.5% of the treatment firms. Propensity scores are calculated from Model 1 in Table 3. In Panel
B, treatment firms are matched with control firms using the nearest-neighbor matching methods (Abadie
et al., 2004). Instead of four nearest matches, treatment firms are matched with one, two, three, five and six
nearest matches from the control group. Matching variables are independent variables in Model 1 of Table
3. Treatment firms and matched control firms are in the same year and industry. Female Appointment is a
dummy variable which equals one if the firm appoints a female director and zero otherwise. Post Period is a
dummy variable which equals one in the period after the appointment and zero in the period before. Control
variables are defined in Table A1. Within-cluster heteroskedasticity and serial correlation robust standard
errors are reported in parentheses. Intercepts are included but not reported. *, **, *** denote statistical
significance at 10%, 5% and 1% respectively.
Panel A: Propensity Score Matching
Dependent Variable = Total Risk Systematic Risk Idiosyncratic Risk
10% (112 Matched Firms)
Female Appointment × Post Period −0.013 0.008 −0.007
(0.036) (0.062) (0.037)
Female Appointment −0.045∗ −0.088∗ −0.048∗
(0.027) (0.046) (0.028)
Post Period −0.004 −0.003 −0.006
(0.012) (0.023) (0.012)
Observations 2,672 2,672 2,672
R2 0.566 0.372 0.557
2% (79 Matched Firms)
Female Appointment × Post Period −0.026 −0.016 −0.014
(0.047) (0.082) (0.048)
Female Appointment −0.028 −0.040 −0.038
(0.034) (0.062) (0.035)
Post Period 0.008 0.016 0.002
(0.023) (0.042) (0.023)
Observations 854 854 854
R2 0.579 0.369 0.560
1% (65 Matched Firms)
Female Appointment × Post Period −0.054 −0.036 −0.039
(0.051) (0.095) (0.051)
Female Appointment −0.002 −0.019 −0.015
(0.036) (0.073) (0.036)
Post Period 0.027 0.025 0.019
(0.030) (0.058) (0.031)
Observations 506 506 506
R2 0.620 0.401 0.597
0.5% (43 Matched Firms)
Female Appointment × Post Period −0.049 −0.077 −0.029
(0.068) (0.127) (0.068)
Female Appointment 0.069 0.115 0.055
(0.046) (0.095) (0.047)
Post Period 0.050 0.080 0.045
(0.041) (0.081) (0.044)
Observations 266 266 266
R2 0.666 0.499 0.644
(Continued on next page...)
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(Table A4 continued)
Panel B: Nearest Neighbor Matching
Dependent Variable = Total Risk Systematic Risk Idiosyncratic Risk
One Nearest Match Per Treatment Firm
Female Appointment × Post Period 0.017 0.064 0.014
(0.027) (0.052) (0.028)
Female Appointment −0.01 −0.028 −0.008
(0.030) (0.055) (0.030)
Post Period −0.024 −0.053 −0.02
(0.021) (0.038) (0.022)
Observations 612 612 612
R2 0.682 0.464 0.675
Two Nearest Matches Per Treatment Firm
Female Appointment × Post Period −0.004 0.029 −0.005
(0.023) (0.045) (0.024)
Female Appointment −0.027 −0.051 −0.028
(0.027) (0.049) (0.027)
Post Period −0.001 −0.014 0
(0.016) (0.029) (0.017)
Observations 1,224 1,224 1,224
R2 0.65 0.428 0.652
Three Nearest Matches Per Treatment Firm
Female Appointment × Post Period −0.001 0.015 −0.002
(0.022) (0.043) (0.023)
Female Appointment −0.025 −0.043 −0.025
(0.025) (0.046) (0.025)
Post Period −0.004 0.002 −0.003
(0.014) (0.025) (0.014)
Observations 1,836 1,836 1,836
R2 0.656 0.443 0.658
Five Nearest Matches Per Treatment Firm
Female Appointment × Post Period −0.012 0.004 −0.011
(0.021) (0.042) (0.021)
Female Appointment −0.024 −0.044 −0.024
(0.024) (0.043) (0.024)
Post Period 0.004 0.01 0.003
(0.012) (0.023) (0.013)
Observations 3,060 3,060 3,060
R2 0.639 0.418 0.643
Six Nearest Matches Per Treatment Firm
Female Appointment × Post Period −0.008 0.001 −0.009
(0.020) (0.041) (0.021)
Female Appointment −0.029 −0.044 −0.03
(0.023) (0.042) (0.024)
Post Period 0.002 0.011 0.002
(0.012) (0.022) (0.012)
Observations 3,672 3,672 3,672
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Figure 1. Board characteristics by year.
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